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that he was part of the U.K. economic policy
debate whether he liked it or not. The fact is that
Friedman’s celebrity was proportionately much
greater in the United Kingdom than in the United
States. The January 1977 issue of the U.K. business
magazine Management Today referred to the
“present controversy, more acute in Britain than
anywhere else, over the teachings of Professor
Milton Friedman”; and even in 2001, long after
the peak of his fame, the London Independent
newspaper described Friedman as “one of the few
economists to have become a household name”
(Independent, August 28, 2001).3
Friedman’s emphasis on the effects of mone-
tary policy, and his opposition to state interven-
tion in the economy, guaranteed that he would
be classified as a marginal figure—if not ignored
outright—by U.K. academic and policy circles
in the early postwar period. Friedman discovered
this for himself during spells in the United
INTRODUCTION
W
hen invited to comment on economic
developments in the United Kingdom,
Milton Friedman frequently prefaced
his remarks with a caveat. Thus in 1964 he tes-
tified, “I have not followed in detail the current
circumstances of the British economy.”1 And
much later in 2005, Friedman likewise stated,
“I have no expertise on recent British experience.”
But it was rare for him to confine his remarks to
this caveat. U.K. economic conditions were an
unrelenting source of interest to Friedman, a self-
described “life-long student of the monetary and
economic experience” of the United Kingdom,2
who, as we will see, was as early as 1943 citing
speeches by contemporary U.K. policymakers
and drawing on U.K. economic data.
In time, Friedman’s influence on U.K. eco-
nomic discussion would become so pervasive
II
1 From the question-and-answer portion of Friedman’s March 3, 1964,
testimony, in Committee on Banking and Currency (1964, p. 1144).
2 Friedman (1980a, p. 55).
3 A bibliographical appendix gives details for newspaper and periodi-
cal articles cited in this paper. Sources in the appendix are arranged
chronologically.
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of Friedman and his positions persisted, with
short-lived exceptional periods, well into the
1960s. But from the late 1960s and afterward,
Friedman’s positions, while still encountering
resistance at the policymaking level, became the
subject of enormous publicity and scrutiny in the
United Kingdom. The control of inflation was at
the center of U.K. political debate from 1968 to
1979, dominating other policy issues during that
period in a way that it did not in the United States,
where Vietnam, Watergate, and superpower rela-
tions competed with, and frequently superseded,
inflation in prominence.
Particularly over this most intense period,
Friedman made interventions himself on the U.K.
scene. He provided commentary on British policy
developments during U.K. visits as well as by
long distance from the United States. Friedman’s
U.K. contributions also included some fundamen-
tal statements of his positions—most notably his
lecture, “The Counter-Revolution in Monetary
Theory” (Friedman, 1970a). This lecture, delivered
at the University of London in September 1970,
was treated by Bernanke (2004) as the most rep-
resentative statement of Friedman’s views on
monetary matters and was what Friedman cited
as the place for a list of “some fundamental propo-
sitions of monetarism.”4
Friedman’s contributions to the U.K. scene
included several rebuttals to criticisms of his
research findings on monetary relations. In 1970
he had stated, “I am so happily blessed with critics
that I have been forced to adopt the general rule
of not replying to them.”5 In light of this policy,
the extent to which critics based in the United
Kingdom were able to smoke him out, and pro-
voke a direct, published rejoinder from Friedman,
is impressive: Nicholas Kaldor in the 1970s,
Frank Hahn and Robert Neild in the 1980s, David
Hendry and Neil Ericsson in the 1990s.
The emergence of the United Kingdom as a
major battleground for the debate on Friedman’s
views, and particularly on Friedman’s version of
monetarism, was amplified by the positions of
the leading Keynesians in the United Kingdom.
As Cobham (1984, p. 160) observes, “British
Keynesianism has traditionally been more
‘extreme,’ more ‘hardline,’ than that prevalent
for example in North America.” In particular, in
the first several postwar decades, U.K. Keynesians
were more inclined than their U.S. counterparts
to dismiss altogether the importance of monetary
policy. The United Kingdom featured a greater
and much longer-lasting “nonmonetary,” or
“money does not matter,” brand of Keynesianism.
That this viewpoint was the establishment posi-
tion in U.K. economics until the 1980s is reflected
in the names of those U.K. economists leading the
opposition to Friedman and monetarism. Among
them were an array of knights and barons: Sir Roy
Harrod, Sir John Hicks, Sir Alec Cairncross, Lord
Kahn, Lord Kaldor, and Lord Balogh.6
Because Keynesianism took a more militant
form in the United Kingdom than in the United
States, the U.K. debates on monetary policy were
more fundamental, and their outcome produced a
greater break in the direction of U.K. policymaking.
This brings me to the subject matter of this
paper, which is the interaction of Friedman and
U.K. economic policy over the period from 1938
to 1979. An obstacle to carrying out a study of this
kind is that Friedman never published a single,
definitive account encapsulating his views on U.K.
developments. True, Friedman and Anna Schwartz
wrote a detailed study of U.K. monetary relations,
their Monetary Trends (Friedman and Schwartz,
1982). But while Friedman once made a shorthand
reference to this book as a study of “U.K. monetary
history” (Wall Street Journal, February 12, 1987),
the volume was not, in fact, a U.K. counterpart
to Friedman and Schwartz’s (1963) A Monetary
History of the United States. Rather, its focus
was on the quantitative analysis of longer-term
economic relations, with Friedman and Schwartz
(1982, p. 605) acknowledging, “We have not made
a similarly exhaustive study of United Kingdom
monetary history.” Monetary Trends does contain
along the way many observations on U.K. develop-
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4 Friedman, quoted in Snowdon, Vane, and Wynarczyk (1994, p. 174).
5 Friedman (1970b, p. 326).
6 After 1979, as governments more sympathetic to monetarism took
charge of the honors system, the tables were turned, and some of
the U.K. monetarist writers received titles: Sir Alan Walters, Sir
Samuel Brittan, Sir James Ball, Lord Griffiths, and so on.ments that are relevant to the present paper and
that are incorporated into my discussion. But the
book is not a sufficient statistic when it comes
to studying Friedman’s views on U.K. economic
developments; it does not contain most of
Friedman’s observations on the year-to-year course
of U.K. economic policy. For that, one must turn
to other places.
And, for a comprehensive account, this means
looking in a lot of places. Friedman’s remarks are
widely dispersed across time and location. Not
only his writings but also many interviews are
relevant, as they frequently contain, in the words
of Friedman and Schwartz (1982, p. 623), “illumi-
nating side comments” on U.K. economic matters.
And of those interviews Friedman gave in which
the United Kingdom was the major topic, many
were in U.K. newspapers that have been neither
indexed nor electronically archived.
At first sight, the multiplicity of sources might
not seem too troublesome: Perhaps, it could be
argued, there are only a few basic Friedman ref-
erences, the remainder being repetition and propa-
gation of his key work. It is true that in the course
of countless lectures, writings, and interviews,
Friedman repeated himself on every dimension:
on the points he made, the historical examples
he cited, the analogies he drew, the anecdotes he
related. Putting aside actual reprints, the repeti-
tion is most evident in the considerable number
of his writings that include extended quotations
from previous works. Even the largely new
Friedman-Schwartz Monetary Trends opened its
concluding chapter with a lengthy excerpt from
a 1972 Friedman paper. And in his 1992 book,
Money Mischief, Friedman only makes it through
six lines of text before deploying a quotation from
an earlier book of his. On one occasion, Friedman,
using a stop-me-before-I-kill form of words,
acknowledged this practice: “I’m sorry to quote
myself all the time, but I can’t help it” (Fortune,
March 19, 1984).
Notwithstanding the heavy repetition, there
is usually some marginal contribution—perhaps
an added observation or an update or qualifica-
tion to previous analysis—even in those works
of Friedman that drew most heavily on his pre-
vious writings. In other words, while Friedman
repeated himself often, he rarely repeated himself
completely. It would, furthermore, be misguided
to think that Friedman’s most relevant observa-
tions on a particular subject appeared in his most
prominent journal publications or in his most
widely cited articles. If anything, the opposite is
the case. This reflects the pattern summarized by
Johnson (1974, p. 346) as Friedman’s “life-long
habit of scattering his new empirical results and
ideas in unlikely places.” Friedman’s tendency
to “fractionate” his written output by spreading
it across an enormous variety of outlets means
that, to obtain the full picture, one has to recon-
stitute the record from this very wide base.
I have carried out such a reconstitution for
this study. The deployment of extensive source
material is a principal contribution of this paper.
The research here is based on an analysis of
Friedman’s publications, including many articles
neither appearing in his book collections nor
available electronically; his op-ed contributions;
his published interviews in newspapers, maga-
zines, and journals, as well as my own meetings
with him; and much unpublished material. I have
built a database of Friedman’s public statements,
based on my extensive microfilm searches, on
physical inspection of hard copies of newspapers,
on information from search services offered by
companies and by newspapers, and on searches
of newspaper and other databases that are pub-
licly electronically archived. My search through
Friedman correspondence included examination
of samples from the Hoover Institution Archives’
catalogued correspondence and of correspondence
yet to be catalogued by the Archives,7 and my own
correspondence with Friedman from 1991 to 2006.
Also, crucially, I draw extensively on material
(both correspondence and memoranda) provided
to me by Anna Schwartz from her own files.8 As
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7 I am indebted to Friedman’s secretary, Gloria Valentine, for fulfill-
ing my requests for information about as-yet-uncatalogued Friedman
files before her retirement in 2007, as well as answering many
inquiries from me on the subject matter of this paper.
8 As well as for the generous access she granted me to this material,
I am indebted to Anna Schwartz for answering numerous inquiries
on the subject matter of this paper. This includes responses to spe-
cific inquiries I made during the course of writing this paper and,
more generally, information conveyed in assorted correspondence,
conversations, and meetings with me from 1991 onward.well as (obviously) covering much of her work
with Friedman on monetary policy generally,
these files cover such U.K.-relevant material as
Friedman’s lecture to the London School of
Economics in May 1952.9 I use Congressional
testimony and submissions by Friedman, includ-
ing several items not included in his comprehen-
sive published bibliographies. I also draw on
transcripts of television interviews Friedman gave
in the United States and the United Kingdom in
the 1960s and 1970s that have been infrequently,
if ever previously, cited.
The remaining discussion in this paper is
divided into chronological segments. For each
segment, I consider the main U.K. economic
events and Friedman’s interaction with them
and then, particular issues in each period. Brief
concluding remarks and a bibliographical appen-
dix complete the paper.
1938-1946
Events
In 1938, Milton Friedman, then age 25, was
based in New York City at the National Bureau
of Economic Research (NBER), where he was
working primarily on completion of his disserta-
tion. His dissertation work came under the
umbrella of what would subsequently be called
“microeconomics,” but Friedman also kept up
with the literature on monetary policy and busi-
ness cycles. It was in this connection that, as he
told Brian Snowdon and Howard Vane, “I bought
[The General Theory of Employment, Interest and
Money (Keynes, 1936)] in 1938 and paid a dollar
and eighty cents for it.”10
Friedman’s recollection was that he was “if
anything[,] somewhat hostile” to the General
Theory (Friedman 1972a, p. 936), and that he was
influenced by the fact that among older economists
there had been “a good deal of skepticism and
dissatisfaction” in response to the book (Friedman,
1982a, p. 9). Moreover, of the younger economists
closest to Friedman, Arthur Burns expressed
reservations about the novelty of the General
Theory, later contending that he had favored
expansionary measures “as early as 1930, before
Keynes’ theories were known.”11
Unlike the initial skeptics, Friedman did not
deny the novelty of Keynes’s theoretical contri-
bution. The General Theory’s explanation for the
Depression and its rationalization for fiscal expan-
sion, Friedman would conclude, were not merely
restatements of preexisting ideas; he would credit
Keynes with a “rigorous and sophisticated analy-
sis” (Friedman, 1968b, p. 1) that provided “a new,
bold, and imaginative hypothesis” (Friedman
1972a, p. 908).
Friedman did share the concern that Keynes’s
book would be seen as giving the green light for
a permanent increase in the size of government.
To the critics, Keynes was providing a respect  -
able theoretical rationalization for extensive
government intervention, through his depiction
of the income-expanding effects of government
purchases and his characterization of private
investment demand as destabilizing. In addition,
Friedman later argued that the underemployment-
equilibrium argument in the General Theory was
“highly congenial to the opponents of the market
system” (Friedman and Schwartz, 1982, p. 43).
Friedman’s verdict at the end of the 1970s was
that the idea that “deficits…were a way of expand-
ing the economy” led to a “tremendous growth in
government spending” (May 17, 1979, testimony,
in Committee on the Judiciary, 1980, p. 149).
These misgivings about the perceived policy
implications of the General Theory reflected
Friedman’s free-market, small-government atti-
tudes, already entrenched by 1938. Friedman
assessed in retrospect that “I was mildly social-
istic” before graduate study (Newsweek, June 15,
1998). But he had been converted to free-market
attitudes during the portion of his graduate stud-
ies that he took at the University of Chicago12—
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9 Where known, I also identify, for the Friedman-Schwartz corre-
spondence, the location of the corresponding copy of the material
in the Friedman papers at the Hoover Archives.
10 In Snowdon and Vane (1997, p. 195).
11 Burns, October 2, 1975, testimony in Committee on the Budget
(1975, p. 170). Friedman described Burns as “really my mentor”
during Friedman’s early career (C-SPAN, November 20, 1994).
12 For example, Friedman (1976a, p. xxi) acknowledged, “I was influ-
enced in this direction by my teachers at the University of Chicago.”“an excellent Department of Economics, I think
the greatest in the country, even before I was
there.”13
What Friedman in 1938 called “this damn
European situation”14 led to the United Kingdom
going to war in September 1939. Following the
United States’ entry into World War II in 1941,
Friedman joined the U.S. Treasury. He later said
that his Treasury colleagues and superiors saw
him as a “starry-eyed theorist.”15 This being the
case, it was as a Keynesian theorist, for Friedman
had largely accepted the theoretical contribution
of the General Theory. In particular, he embraced
its skeptical perspective on monetary policy.
Friedman acknowledged in a television interview
in 1994 that “when I was at the Treasury, I was
essentially a Keynesian, as I believed that the way
to control inflation was by controlling government
spending. I paid very little attention to money”
(C-SPAN, November 20, 1994).
The Keynesian perspective is so clear in
Friedman’s early 1940s writings that monetarists
such as Laidler (2003) have marveled at the con-
trast with Friedman’s later work. Friedman
expressed a similar sense of surprise when look-
ing at the 1940s work from the vantage point of
three decades later. “In a note on the inflationary
gap that I published in 1942,” Friedman said in a
November 1971 talk (Friedman, 1972b, p. 183),
“I never mentioned the quantity of money or
monetary factors at all!”
The Keynesian position that there was a
region where money and income had a very loose
relationship with one another was, to Friedman,
seemingly confirmed by his look at data. His (1943)
paper on inflation, written while at the Treasury,
plotted growth rates of nominal money and nomi-
nal income for the United States for 1899-1929;
the plot led to Friedman’s judgment that the
relationship was “extremely unstable.”16 This
judgment seems untenable. Simple inspection of
the scatterplot in Friedman’s paper (Friedman,
1943, p. 121) indicates that the money growth–
income growth relationship is clearly positive
and reasonably tight by the standards of rate-of-
change data.
Friedman also embraced some of Keynes’s
post–General Theory ideas, notably those in
Keynes’s How to Pay for the War (1940).
Friedman’s contribution to “inflationary gap”
analysis was in this tradition. This work (Friedman,
1942, 1943) revealed a close following of U.K.
developments. Specifically, Friedman (1943)
discussed “recent English discussion of fiscal
policy [that] has centered on the so-called ‘infla-
tionary gap,’” discussed U.K. gap estimates made
by British economist Frank Paish, and cited a 1943
House of Commons speech by the Chancellor of
the Exchequer, Kingsley Wood, a speech known
to have been drafted by Keynes (see Samuelson,
1946).
“Inflationary gap” analysis had in common
with Friedman’s later work the portrayal of infla-
tion as demand inflation. The details of how
inflation emerged, however, were different in his
1940s’ analysis. Inflation in this analysis was seen
as serving to equalize the nominal value of poten-
tial output and the nominal volume of aggregate
spending. Potential output was assumed to have
a physical ceiling, so that price change took up all
the excess spending above this maximum. There
was, in contrast to later Keynesian and monetarist
work, no allowance for “overfull employment.”
Reflecting his later use of the overfull employment
concept, Friedman would say in 1972, “I think
people are wrong in supposing that there is a rigid
ceiling on output such that further increases in
real output are impossible…It is possible to have
overemployment as well as underemployment.”17
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13 Milton Friedman Speaks, Episode 8, p. 30 of transcript. Milton
Friedman Speaks was the name given to a series of Friedman talks
in the United States videotaped over 1977-78 and used to promote
interest in a projected television series for Friedman; see Friedman
and Friedman (1998, pp. 477-78, 604). The series was released on
a limited basis on videotape, accompanied by official transcripts,
in 1980, and was more recently repackaged as a commercially
available DVD set. References made in this paper are generally to
the transcripts, but all the quotations from the transcripts also
appear on the DVD releases.
14 March 17, 1938, letter from Milton Friedman to Rose Friedman,
quoted in Friedman and Friedman (1998, p. 77).
15 For example, in Newsweek, July 24, 1978.
16 Friedman (1943, p. 119). Friedman contrasted this with what he
called the “considerably more regular” empirical relation between
consumption and income, which supported Keynesian theory
(1943, p. 120).
17 Friedman (1973a, p. 35).In postwar work, Friedman and others would
accordingly distinguish carefully between poten-
tial and maximum output.18 In particular, the
notion that output could temporarilyexceed poten-
tial, and unemployment fall below its natural rate,
was a contribution of Friedman’s natural rate
hypothesis (e.g., 1968b, 1977a). Nevertheless, the
concepts of positive output gaps, and associated
overfull employment, were innovations neither
of Friedman nor of the Phillips curve literature;
they were in place earlier than the 1950s and
1960s. The possibility that overfull employment
could occur was specifically embodied in the U.K.
policymaking framework by the late 1940s.
“During World War II,” Friedman later recalled,
“governments everywhere had largely assumed
control of the economy. And it was simply almost
taken for granted that they would have to continue
to do so in the postwar period.”19 The Attlee gov-
ernment was elected in the U.K. general election
of July 1945. Friedman noted, “In Britain, the
Labour Party’s postwar victory over Winston
Churchill spelled a commitment to central plan-
ning” (Newsweek, July 14, 1975).
Issues
Nationalization and Central Planning.
Friedman observed that the postwar shift to
greater government economic control had been
justified on efficiency grounds: It was believed
“that centralized and comprehensive economic
planning and control by government is an essen-
tial requisite for economic development”
(Friedman, 1958a, p. 505). He noted that, in
particular, nationalization of industries was moti-
vated by this consideration (The Listener, April 27,
1978). The Attlee government used the efficiency
argument when implementing a broad national-
ization program after it came to power.
This nationalization program was believed
to be appealing to U.K. electors, to judge by the
notice of their plans that leading Labour politi-
cians gave in the months approaching the election.
Stafford Cripps, later Chancellor of the Exchequer,
said, “We must replace the libertinism of private
enterprise by a planned system of economy which
calls for a considerable measure of state control
and ownership.” As did many in the West, Cripps
cited the Soviet Union as a successful economic
model: “In Russia you have a State-planned and
controlled industry, and I cite this as an example
to show that some form of centralized planning
and control helps and does not retard efficient
production and full employment” (News-
Chronicle, December 18, 1944).
The nationalizations undertaken by the Attlee
government (1945-51) encompassed mining,
communications, the railway system, and steel.20
Friedman had anticipated that a still more compre-
hensive nationalization scheme would be carried
out. He observed in 1972 of the late 1940s, “If you
had asked us then about the health of capitalism
and free enterprise 25 years later, I think we would
have said it would be closer to its deathbed than
it actually is now.”21
In fact, Friedman’s Capitalism and Freedom
(1962a) contains remarks to the effect that he
thought that in the United Kingdom the move
toward greater government intervention had
peaked even before the Attlee government left
office. In particular, Friedman took comfort
from the fact that central planning, as opposed
to nationalization, had not endured in Western
economies beyond the 1940s. The detailed direc-
tion of resources, public and private, had been
foreshadowed by the Attlee government; as
Friedman noted, “immediately after World War II,
it was thought that the government was going to
get involved, especially in Britain…in central
economic planning on a large scale.”22 Efforts to
replace the price system with government direc-
tion of allocation decisions had, he argued, fal-
tered and led to socialism peaking in the United
Kingdom in 1948 (Vision, April 1972). Friedman
18 Friedman would still believe that there was a physical ceiling on
output (see the expositions of his plucking model in Friedman
1964b, 1993), but he no longer treated this ceiling as synonymous
with the natural level of output.
19 Quoted in Levy (1992).
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20 See Childs (2006, p. 14) for a tabulation of the Attlee government’s
nationalizations.
21 Friedman speaking in Business and Society Review, Spring 1972;
reprinted in Friedman (1975a, p. 253).
22 Free to Choose, PBS debate 1980, Episode 3, p. 9 of transcript.(1962a, p. 11) singled out the fate of the Attlee
government’s Control of Engagements Order,
which, he said, would have meant a directed-
labor economy if it had been enforced. The Order
was not, in fact, enforced heavily and was then
repealed, an event Friedman identified as a “turn-
ing point” (Friedman, 1962a, p. 11) when “central
planning came to a screeching halt” in the United
Kingdom.23
But Friedman further revised his opinion in
the 1970s: He observed in 1972, “I was much
more optimistic in 1962 than was justified by
what happened later.”24 Friedman continued to
acknowledge that the momentum for planning
and nationalization had stalled, noting that
“[t]here is less central planning in Britain now
than in 1946,”25 but he now judged that this had
“diverted…growth [in government] to a different
channel” (New York Times, August 13, 1994).
Greater government influence on resource allo-
cation, he argued, had instead been achieved via
expansion of government spending (including
transfer programs) and of regulation (Friedman,
1976c; Friedman and Friedman, 1998, p. 582). This
changed perception was reflected in Friedman’s
descriptions of the U.K. system: Whereas he
characterized what was launched in the United
Kingdom in the 1940s as “a policy of welfare
statism and central planning” (Saturday Evening
Post, May/June 1977), Friedman argued that the
system evolved into “a socialist and welfare state”
(National Review, December 31, 1997).
Cheap Money. Many countries followed
“cheap money” policies in World War II and its
aftermath; the U.S. case is the subject of Friedman
and Schwartz (1963, Chaps. 10 and 11). In the
United Kingdom, the postwar “cheap money”
policy is associated with the attempt by
Chancellor of the Exchequer Hugh Dalton to
break with the practice his adviser, John Maynard
Keynes, had described as “the unwillingness of
most monetary authorities to deal boldly in debts
of long term” (Keynes, 1936, p. 207). Although
announced by the Attlee government upon its
election, the long-term bond program began in
earnest in October 1946, several months after
Keynes’s death. Among the new government
bonds created in 1946 was a series of 2.5 percent
“irredeemable” securities, that is, securities that
might be held indefinitely as a source of interest
income; these new long-term securities were
unofficially known as “Daltons” or “Dalton con-
sols.” By issuing very-low-yield medium- and
long-term securities, Dalton attempted to extend
the government’s existing low interest rate policy
to the entire term structure. “We have been grad-
ually conditioning the capital market to a long-
term rate of 2½%,” Dalton observed. “...I am sure
that our cheap money policy should continue to
be resolutely pressed home” (Financial Times,
October 17, 1946).
The U.K. and U.S. authorities’ interest in
influencing long-term rates rested heavily on the
Keynesian position that long-term rates mattered
for aggregate demand much more than short rates;
this interest was qualified by the consideration
that, as Friedman and Schwartz (1963, p. 700)
observe, even the sensitivity of demand to long-
term rates was not thought to be substantial.
Low long-term interest rates were also perceived
as contributing to the flexibility of fiscal policy
by easing the financing of the national debt. So
the extension of the cheap money policy to the
long-term market had both Keynesian and debt-
management motivations.
The Dalton program of October 1946, while
involving the creation of new debt instruments,
was intended to drive existing longer-term secu-
rities’ rates down to 2.5 percent too (see, e.g.,
Hallowell, 1950, p. 41); this contrasted with the
rates between 3 percent and 3.5percent prevail-
ing for most of the period since 1932 (Hallowell,
1950, p. 23; Robertson, 1949, p. 22).26 Since Bank
Rate was left unchanged, the experiment was not
making use of the expectations theory of the term
structure. On the contrary, the expectations theory
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23 In Business and Society Review, Spring 1972; reprinted in Friedman
(1975a, p. 254).
24 Friedman, October 20, 1972, remarks, in Selden (1975, p. 51).
25 From Business and Society Review, Spring 1972, reprinted in
Friedman (1975a, p. 254).
26 When serving as a discussant of Friedman’s in 1970, Sir Roy Harrod
paraphrased Dalton’s rationale for the reduction in the long-term
rate as that if “we could run a great war at 3%, we ought to be able
to run the peace at 2.5%” (Harrod, 1971, p. 59).would suggest that keeping the short rate
unchanged tended to work against the success of
a policy to reduce long-term rates. From the per-
spective of the General Theory, however, the
approach made some sense: The General Theory
saw securities as becoming equivalents of money
before their yield became zero; insofar as short-
term interest rates were perceived as already
having hit their floor, but long-term rates had not
reached their floor, the monetary authorities could
carry out operations directly in long-term securi-
ties markets to encourage reductions in longer-
term rates.
Wilson (1984, p. 76) observes that there were
“few British economists in the 1950s and 1960s
who advocated control of the money supply—
Robertson, Robbins, Paish, Dacey, myself [Thomas
Wilson], and one or two others.” Among those on
this list who were active in the 1940s, Robertson
was perhaps the leader and is acknowledged in
Friedman and Friedman (1998, p. 247) as an early
distinguished skeptic regarding Keynesian eco-
nomics. That skepticism is evident in Robertson’s
discussions of the Dalton monetary policy, as
Robertson (1949, p. 22) counts himself among
those “who dared to question the wisdom of this
[1946] further turn of the [cheap money] screw.”
A fellow critic, Dacey (1947, p. 59) wrote that “it
is surprising that Mr. Dalton should have thought
it good statesmanship to press rates down further
at a time when inflationary forces are only kept in
check with the assistance of a formidable admin-
istrative apparatus [i.e., price controls].”
Friedman’s own later work contained critical
observations on the U.K.’s monetary framework
during the 1940s. There are many further criticisms
implicit in Friedman’s descriptions of what mone-
tary policy can and should do. Friedman’s frame-
work centered, first and foremost, on the point
that “monetary policy is not about interest rates;
monetary policy is about the rate of growth of the
quantity of money.”27 The Fisher relation pro-
vided the only enduring channel by which the
central bank could affect interest rates, be they
short- or long-term. Monetary policy could exert
other, more transitory influences on interest rates,
but Friedman was skeptical that these influences
justified central banks’ claims that they could
control long-term interest rates (see, e.g., Friedman
and Schwartz, 1963, p. 514). Certainly, he believed
that a base money injection could produce some
temporary downward pressure on long-term rates,
both via the standard expectations channel (i.e.,
via the liquidity effect on current and expected
future short rates) and via a portfolio effect on the
long-short spread or term premium (see, e.g.,
his June 1966 memorandum to the Board of
Governors, published in Friedman, 1968a, p. 156).
But for the central bank to exploit these effects
in a way that made the long-term interest rate a
policy instrument would require being able to
overwhelm the “nonmonetary forces affecting
interest rates”28 as well as the Fisher effect, which
showed up in “long-term interest rates much
sooner”29 than in short-term rates and worked in
the opposite direction of the liquidity and port-
folio effects of the money injection. Moreover,
Friedman noted, the sustainability of this policy
was doubtful, since for a central bank to “peg a
particular interest rate…it must accept whatever
happens to other magnitudes affected by the
[monetary] base, including the level of inflation”
(Wall Street Journal, April 5, 1990).
The Dalton attempt to bring down long-term
rates had the temporary appearance of success.
Rates on existing long-term securities fell toward
the new 2.5 percent baseline. For example,
Friedman and Schwartz’s (1982, Table 4.9, p. 133)
data on “old” consols (i.e., the perpetual-horizon
security already being traded before the release of
the new, “Dalton” consols) show an average rate
of 2.92 percent in 1945 and 2.6 percent in 1946.
But the effort to hold down long-term interest rates
did prove unsustainable, and in the course of
1947 long-term rates rebounded; Friedman and
Schwartz’s series shows an average for 1947 of
2.76 percent, rising to 3.21 percent in 1948.
Friedman (1970a, p. 8) observed, “Chancellor
Dalton tried to follow the Keynesian policy of
keeping interest rates very low. As you all know,
Nelson
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27 From Friedman’s appearance on Meet the Press, October 24, 1976.
28 From Friedman’s October 1965 memorandum to the Board of
Governors, published in Friedman (1968a, p. 136).
29 Friedman (1983, p. 11).he was unable to do so and had to give up.” A few
months after Dalton left office, the Financial Times
reported, “The attempt to hold the rate of interest
on government long-term borrowing at 2½% has
now been officially abandoned” (Financial Times,
January 3, 1948).
The pressure on the cheap money policy in
the United Kingdom was more acute than in the
United States because the associated pressure on
aggregate demand was one-sided. An interest rate
peg can in principle be contractionary in effect,
as when the central bank has to withdraw base
money to enforce the peg. Friedman and Schwartz
(1963, p. 596) find that the U.S. cheap money
policy indeed produced deflationary pressure over
1948, and Friedman and Schwartz (1982, p. 76)
classify 1948-49 as a business contraction in the
United States. No corresponding contractionary
episode is evident during the U.K. postwar cheap
money period, and Friedman and Schwartz (1982,
p. 76) classify 1946-59 as a continuous expansion
in the United Kingdom. The U.K. experience con-
sequently corresponded more literally than did
the U.S. case to Friedman’s summary statement
that “the stock of money rose as a result of the
cheap-money policies and so did prices, either
openly or in whatever disguise.”30
The Dalton policy on long-term interest rates
was the first element of the U.K. monetary frame-
work to break under this one-sided pressure; the
exchange rate policy was next, with sterling deval-
uation taking place in 1949. The outbreak of the
Korean War in 1950 magnified the pressure on the
remaining component of the cheap money policy,
namely, the holding of Bank Rate at 2 percent.
The Financial Times noted (February 10, 1951):
“Both the British and American governments seem
determined not to use higher interest rates to com-
bat inflation.” This determination contrasted with
Friedman’s position, which he articulated in 1952
as follows: “The purpose of monetary policy is to
maintain price stability, and on some occasions
this will call for actions that tend to raise interest
rates.”31 Bank Rate was finally raised by the
newly elected Churchill government in November
1951. “No country succeeded in stemming infla-
tion without adopting measures that made it
possible to restrain the growth in the stock of
money,” Friedman observed at the end of the
1950s. “And every country that did hold down
the growth in the stock of money succeeded in
checking the price rise.”32
1946-1959
Events
Friedman’s first visit to the United Kingdom
in 1948, consisting of “two or three days in
England, in London,”33 left him convinced that
it was being “economically strangled by the law
obedience of her citizens” (Friedman, 1962b).
Friedman was persuaded by the argument made
by George Stigler, with whom he made the trip,
that price controls were distorting the United
Kingdom to an extent that they were not in France,
because of the more-extensive French under-
ground economy.34 Price controls had been intro-
duced by the United Kingdom in wartime,
Friedman later observed, in an “attempt to sup-
press the inflation arising from wartime spending,
financed largely by increasing the money supply”
(Newsweek, November 27, 1972). The Attlee gov-
ernment continued the controls into peacetime.
Friedman opposed price controls both as a wartime
and a peacetime measure (see his October 6, 1969,
testimony in Joint Economic Committee, 1970,
pp. 815-16) The peacetime controls in the United
Kingdom and on the Continent were, he argued in
an early intervention, impeding Europe’s economic
recovery (New York Times, January 11, 1948).
Other damaging restrictions, Friedman con-
tended, came in the “foreign exchange controls
that strangled Western Europe after the war.”35
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30 May 25, 1959, testimony, in Joint Economic Committee (1959a, 
p. 607; p. 138 of 1964 reprint).
31 March 25, 1952, testimony, in Joint Committee on the Economic
Report (1952, p. 736).
32 May 25, 1959, testimony, in Joint Economic Committee (1959a, p.
607; p. 138 of 1964 reprint).
33 Milton Friedman Speaks, Episode 1, p. 9 of transcript.
34 Friedman (1962b); and Milton Friedman Speaks, Episode 1, p. 9
of transcript.
35 Friedman (1964a); p. 78 of 1969 reprint.Foreign exchange controls were not initially
emphasized by Friedman in the 1940s, when his
focus was on price control. “I wrote my first
article [on exchange controls] in 1950,” Friedman
later recalled, “when I was in France in connec-
tion with the Common Market arrangements”
(Jerusalem Post, November 6, 1987). For the United
Kingdom, Friedman’s position, maintained from
the early 1950s, was that exchange controls had
such a depressing effect on the level of the pound
sterling that if the U.K. authorities floated the
pound and maintained exchange controls, the
pound would tend to depreciate, whereas if they
floated simultaneously with the removal of
exchange controls, the pound would appreciate
(Friedman, 1953b; Friedman and Schwartz, 1982a,
pp. 290-94). This conjecture was borne out when
the pound appreciated after the abolition of
exchange controls in 1979. Friedman criticized
the exchange controls on economic grounds, but
“entirely aside” from their economic aspects, he
opposed them on grounds of “human freedom.”36
It violated the “free market in ideas,” he said in
1977, “if a country, as Great Britain did immedi-
ately after the war, has exchange controls under
which no citizen of Britain may buy a foreign
book unless he got authorization from the Bank
of England.”37
Even by the early 1950s, the United Kingdom
had acquired a basket-case image in the United
States for its postwar performance, with extensive
economic aid by the United States to the United
Kingdom highlighting the problem. “When people
say, ‘Well, American aid bailed Germany out,’ 
I add that American aid also bailed Britain out,”
Friedman later observed. “The amount we gave
to Britain in the British-American loan was far
greater than anything Germany got” (Saturday
Evening Post, May/June 1977).
The United Kingdom was also a recipient of
aid from the United States via the Marshall Plan.
Friedman contended that “Europe would have
recovered with or without the Marshall Plan,”
and opposed the Plan at the time and in retrospect
(Friedman, 1982a, pp. 32-33). He argued that the
“Marshall Plan and similar programs” of the U.S.
government had “been harmful to the rest of the
world”38 because government-to-government
economic aid strengthened the government sector
at the expense of the private sector.39 It was,
nevertheless, as an adviser to the Marshall Plan
that Friedman made a second visit to Europe, in
late 1950, basing himself in Paris (Friedman, 1992,
p. 248; Friedman and Friedman, 1998, Chap. 12).
“Plans to spend a quarter at the London School
[of Economics] in the spring of 1952 fell through,”
Friedman recalled in 1994, “but did lead to my
making a three-week trip to Britain and France,
giving two lectures at the London School of
Economics.”40 Friedman’s talk, “Classical Counter-
Revolution and Monetary Theory and Policy,” at
the London School of Economics in May 1952,
opened with a major gaffe—or a clanger, to use
the U.K. nomenclature. His speaking notes state,
“With some hesitancy the American speaks on
this topic to an English audience. Basic contri-
butions all English. Classical—Hume, Ricardo,
Thornton, Marshall…”41 The problem, of course,
was that David Hume was Scottish, not English.
Indeed, the two British economists with whom
Friedman identified most and whom he would
most often quote in his writings, Hume and Adam
Smith, were Scottish. To judge by Friedman’s later
statements, he learned his lesson and became
more careful about distinguishing the Scottish
from the English. In arguing against the Bretton
Woods system during Congressional testimony
in 1963, Friedman noted that what mattered to
the U.K. consumer was a good’s U.K. price, not
the same price expressed in U.S. dollars; differ-
ent dollar values of the price were “all the same
to an Englishman—or even a Scotsman.”42
Around the time of Friedman’s 1952 visit, the
U.K. unemployment rate averaged 2.1 percent;
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38 September 23, 1971, testimony, in Joint Economic Committee
(1971, p. 722).
39 For Friedman’s elaborations of this argument, see Friedman (1958a)
and Newsweek, December 21, 1970.
40 From Friedman’s notes “1952 MF trip,” in a 1994 letter to Anna
Schwartz; courtesy Anna Schwartz.
41 May 1952 lecture notes by Friedman; courtesy Anna Schwartz.
42 November 14, 1963, testimony, in Joint Economic Committee (1963,
p. 454).
36 Free to Choose BBC2 debate, March 22, 1980, p. 21 of transcript.
37 Milton Friedman Speaks, Episode 3, p. 16 of transcript.in 1951 it was only 1.2 percent, and in 1953 the
average was 1.8 percent.43 These were lower rates
than prevailing in the United States, but Friedman
later cautioned against interpreting such low rates
as a badge of honor. In his Nobel lecture, Friedman
cited the United Kingdom in the 1950s as an
example of a country with an inefficiently low
unemployment rate, reflecting the fact that a
“highly static rigid economy may have a fixed
place for everyone” (Friedman, 1977a, p. 459).
Friedman elaborated in 2004: “Progress depends—
it sounds funny, but it’s true—on unemployment…
Because that’s the only way you can provide the
necessary labor force for the new development,
the new industries that are coming along”
(Investor’s Business Daily, April 15, 2004).
The U.K. economy in the 1950s not only fea-
tured an inefficiently low unemployment rate,
but also a tendency for aggregate demand to be
expanded too rapidly, forcing unemployment
temporarily below its low natural value and creat-
ing inflationary pressure. Since U.K. policymakers
were aware by the late 1940s of the distinction
between full and overfull employment, the ques-
tion arises why they kept overdoing expansion.
Some of the overheating in the late 1940s and the
1950s might be attributed to preemptive stimulus
in anticipation of a collapse in private demand.
Friedman (1973a, p. 5) noted that while “a great
post-war depression…was widely predicted,” it
“kept being expected but it never occurred.” This
observation was true of the United Kingdom, with
Chancellor Dalton stating in 1945 that the “govern-
ment must arm itself with anti-slump powers, so
that never again, as in past years, shall prices, pro-
ductivity, and employment all fall away through
the failure of private enterprise” (Financial Times,
November 23, 1945). In particular, “secular stag-
nation,” due to drying up of private investment
opportunities and to excessive consumer saving,
was feared in the 1940s and cited as a reason for
the government stepping in with its own demand
for output. Friedman was an early critic of the
secular stagnation thesis (Friedman, 1948, p. 262),
and the criticism had become widespread by the
1950s as the prospect of a consumption collapse
dwindled. In fact, the secular stagnation theory
was one aspect of Keynes’s thinking that was
widely rejected in the United Kingdom even in
the Keynesian 1950s; the Financial Times, for
example, referred to “Keynes’ one-sided fear of
over-saving” (May 23, 1955) and to “Keynes’
incredibly shortsighted forecast of declining
investment opportunities” (October 15, 1956). But
precisely because the relevance of the secular
stagnation hypothesis was in so much doubt by
the 1950s, it is hard to cite belief in it as the reason
for continued U.K. overexpansion in that decade.
The repeated failures over the 1950s to deliver
the proper dosage of demand seem most attribut-
able to the U.K. government’s misguided view of
how to affect demand. Here, fiscal policy received
pride of place, reflected in Chancellor of the
Exchequer Peter Thorneycroft’s observation in
1957, “The big instrument of government policy
in all these matters is the budget” (Daily Express,
July 13, 1957). This contrasts with Friedman’s
position on fiscal policy which, of course, was
this: “In my opinion, a budget deficit is ‘expan-
sionary’ only if it is financed by printing money”
(Newsweek, February 15, 1971). According to this
interpretation, any apparent connection between
fiscal actions and aggregate demand was not an
indication of the working of the Keynesian multi-
plier process, but was instead a by-product (a
“disguised reflection” in the terminology of
Friedman and Meiselman, 1963) of the fact that
deficits in practice were monetized.
Figure 1 plots the ratio of the U.K. budget
balance to nominal gross domestic product (GDP),
and the growth rate of the U.K. monetary base.
The budgetary series is one available for 1948-99,
now discontinued but formerly reported as line
80 in hard copies of the International Monetary
Fund (IMF)’s International Financial Statistics
(IFS). Nominal GDP is the annual average series
for the United Kingdom from Haver-IFS (down-
loaded March 2009). The monetary base series is
the annual average of a series obtained by splic-
ing annual averages of the Capie-Webber series
(1985) into the Bank of England break-adjusted
base money series. The plotted growth rate of the
base closely resembles that depicted in Benati
(2005, Chart 1), which was based on similar
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resemble those of the high-powered money series
in Friedman and Schwartz (1982, pp. 125-26).
Base growth is highly correlated with the budget-
balance share for 1948-79 (correlation = –0.80),
while the correlation for 1980-99 is negligible
(correlation = 0.08). The association between base
growth and deficits supports Friedman’s conten  -
tion that in the early postwar decades U.K. govern-
ment deficits were monetized,44 so that the period
simply does not provide clean evidence of the
effects of “pure” fiscal policy. Attempts to quan-
tify a multiplier impact of deficits and surpluses
without attempting to hold constant the reaction of
the monetary authorities merely beg the question.
It may seem perplexing that my discussion
of demand policies in the United Kingdom in the
1950s has been able to proceed so far without a
discussion of the fact that the pound sterling was
on a fixed exchange rate. I have occasionally seen
it argued that the U.K. authorities did not actually
pursue Keynesian policies before the 1970s
because they were constrained by their Bretton
Woods obligations.45 This argument overlooks
the extent to which foreign exchange controls
reduced the impact of the exchange rate constraint
on the formation of demand management policy.
As Friedman and Schwartz (1963, p. 105) observe
in discussing the postwar United Kingdom, “the
development of direct exchange and trade controls
gave it means of affecting its balance of payments
other than through movements in prices and
incomes”; relatedly, exchange controls gave the
U.K. authorities some room to separate fixing the
exchange rate from setting interest rates. There
was no occasion in the 1950s when there was a
Bank Rate increase that could not be justified by
domestic conditions; reflecting this, the Bank of
Nelson
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Figure 1
U.K. Budget-Balance Share of GDP versus Monetary Base Growth (1948-99, annual data)
44 Friedman (1975c, pp. 72-73) argues that fiscal deficits were stim-
ulative in Western countries in the postwar period (up to that
point) because they were, in practice, monetized.
45 This argument was used, for example, by R.J. Ball in the Financial
Times, February 4, 1981.England governor testified in 1958 that foreign
exchange market considerations had determined
the timing (in terms of the specific week) of Bank
Rate moves, but not the actual moves themselves,
which were invariably also shaped by internal
considerations.46 Bretton Woods did not override
what the Financial Times (December 21, 1953)
called the “modern principle of shaping policy
by reference to domestic monetary needs.” The
coexistence of substantial monetary policy inde-
pendence and a fixed exchange rate explains why,
during the 1950s and 1960s, Lionel Robbins simul-
taneously criticized the idea of floating rates and
advocated that the U.K. monetary authorities
manipulate the monetary base to achieve price
stability. As Friedman (1978) later pointed out, a
bona fide conflict between the exchange rate and
domestic considerations in the Bretton Woods
system led typically to the exchange rate giving
way, as it did in the United Kingdom in 1949,
1967, and 1972.
By the time of Friedman’s 1953-54 spell in the
United Kingdom, the development of Friedman’s
monetarism was well advanced, to the point
where, in reprinting his (1942) essay on inflation,
he added material on money, attributing its pre-
vious absence to the “prevailing Keynesian tem-
per” of the 1940s (Friedman, 1953a, p. 253).
Friedman also had had a letter published in The
Economist (January 3, 1953) advocating that ster-
ling be floated.
A review of Friedman’s Essays in Positive
Economics (1953a) appeared in the Financial
Times of February 8, 1954, apparently the first-
ever mention of Friedman in that newspaper. The
review was devoted mostly to Friedman’s argu-
ment for floating exchange rates (Friedman,
1953b). The review said that Friedman “grossly
overstates his case…when claiming that flexible
exchanges would have obviated the sterling crises
of 1947, 1949, and 1951.” The review apparently
regarded Friedman as neglecting the possibility
that devaluation could worsen the current account
balance measured in pounds. This was one of
several critiques of Friedman’s argument for float-
ing exchange rates that took Friedman as implying
that a float removes current account deficits in
the balance of payments. It is true that Friedman
generally regarded depreciations as good for the
sterling trade balance and that a low-enough ster-
ling exchange rate would remove the trade deficit;
he said so in his 1953 letter to The Economist, for
example. But, to my knowledge, Friedman did
not claim that a floating exchange rate would
converge to the value consistent with a zero trade
or current account balance; his claim for floats
was the correct and general one that they elimi-
nate the possibility of balance of payments deficits
or surpluses, so that “[b]alance of payments
problems in the technical sense are a reflection
of price fixing.”47
Issues
The Early Monetarist. Two beliefs are wide-
spread about Friedman’s origins as a monetarist.
The first belief is that his earliest monetarist
work appeared in 1956.48 The second is that, in
the 1956 paper and elsewhere, Friedman merely
dotted the i’s and crossed the t’s of existing work
by Keynes and of pre-1956 Keynesian work, so
that the theoretical innovations of monetarism
were negligible (at least if contributions regarding
the expectational Phillips curve are put to one
side). Both beliefs are misconceptions. They
are naturally handled together since the non-
Keynesian aspects of Friedman’s framework are
not all present in his 1956 paper, but are evident
if the totality of his work over 1948-58 is con-
sidered. The discussion below shows that the
literature’s characterization of the 1956 paper as
the launching pad for Friedman’s monetarism
has obscured some of the major theoretical dif-
ferences with Keynesianism that were already
visible in other work by Friedman in the 1950s.
It complements the cataloguing by Friedman
(1972a) and Meltzer (1977) of distinctions between
Friedman’s framework and Keynesianism but
includes items not in their lists. It also serves to
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Committee (1960, pp. 137, 155).
47 September 23, 1971, testimony, in Joint Economic Committee
(1971, p. 701).
48 See, for example, Eshag (1983).confirm Friedman’s observation (in his Reason
interview of June 1995) that the key arguments
he made in his 1960s’ and 1970s’ publications
were already present in his 1950s’ work.
First, Friedman argued as early as 1948 for a
focus on monetary policy for the control of infla-
tion. A letter he and other Chicago faculty mem-
bers wrote to the New York Times in early 1948
was entitled “Control of Prices: Regulation of
Money Supply to Halt Inflation Advocated”
(January 11, 1948). In claiming that “a marked
increase of the general level of prices unaccompa-
nied by a marked increase in the supply of money
is a rare if not nonexistent phenomenon,” this
letter reflected early dissent by Friedman from
Keynesianism49 and was followed by Friedman’s
(1950, p. 474) sympathetic remarks about the
quantity theory. In 1952, Friedman was firmly
associated with the quantity theory position, and
Friedman published his finding that income and
price changes in U.S. wartime episodes were “more
readily explicable by the quantity theory than by
the income-expenditure theory” (Friedman, 1952,
p. 721).50
Second, Friedman (1951) argued for treating
prices and wages as endogenous variables at all
levels of employment, in contrast to the Keynesian
treatment (and Friedman’s in 1942-43) of prices
as insensitive to aggregate demand until full
employment was reached.
Third, Friedman advocated floating exchange
rates from 1950, when his (1953b) essay on the
subject was drafted, using arguments that rested
on the ability of monetary policy to deliver price
stability.
Fourth, in the 1950s Friedman rejected cost-
push factors as a source of sustained inflationary
pressure. While Friedman (1948) had given cre-
dence to cost-push factors as one factor driving
up wages, in 1951 he said, “My views about this
have changed considerably in the last few years”
(Friedman, 1951, p. 228). In 1952 Friedman testi-
fied, “I think the so-called wage-price spiral has
been enormously exaggerated, that what we have
had has been inflationary pressure pulling both
wages and prices up.”51 His rejection of cost-push
is clear also in his repudiation in Friedman
(1953b) of the idea that exchange rate depreciation
could trigger a self-sustaining wage/price spiral.
Friedman’s position from the early 1950s was that
cost-push factors had a zero mean in themselves;
upward pressure on wages or prices in one sector
would be “balanced by declines elsewhere in
other prices and costs.”52 Any tendency for infla-
tion to exhibit a sustained rise in the face of a
positive wage or price shock reflected monetary
accommodation, so cost-push factors could not
alter inflationary expectations in the absence of
a monetary expansion. This rejection of cost-push
distinguished Friedman not only from Keynesians
(among whom the popularity of cost-push expla-
nations increased over the 1950s, in both the
United States and the United Kingdom), but also
from some advocates of monetary control such
as Robbins. In contrast to Friedman, Robbins
believed that wage-push factors put a positive
bias into U.K. wage inflation, in the face of which
monetary policy needed to be contractionary
(rather than simply nonaccommodating) to deliver
price stability.53
Fifth, Friedman rejected the notion of a long-
run trade-off between unemployment and infla-
tion. In a 1950 symposium (Wright, 1951, p. 243),
Friedman said “I don’t know what you mean by
saying unemployment will police inflation.” In
1952 Congressional testimony he said, “Rather
51 March 25, 1952, testimony, in Joint Committee on the Economic
Report (1952, p. 727); see also Friedman (1952, fn. 7).
52 March 25, 1952, testimony, in Joint Committee on the Economic
Report (1952, p. 736).
53 Note that the view that unions can be an autonomous source of
wage-push is distinct from the view that unions can raise the natural
rate of unemployment, since wage- or cost-push refers to inflation-
ary pressure created for a given difference between unemployment
and the natural rate. As for whether union pressure could affect
the natural rate, Friedman regarded the conditions for this to occur
as restrictive—he argued that unions could raise unemployment
in certain sectors, but not necessarily in the aggregate (Friedman,
1951; The Times, August 29, 1973; The Economist, September 28,
1974)—but he sometimes implied that the conditions for an effect
on aggregate unemployment might have been satisfied in the
postwar United Kingdom (e.g., Friedman 1963a; Friedman and
Friedman, 1980).
Nelson
478 SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER, PART 2 2009 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEW
49 Brunner and Meltzer (1993) date Friedman’s earliest dissent to
Friedman (1944).
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velocity in a meeting in Chicago in early 1951 (Harrod, 1971, p. 58).than regarding the objectives of high employ-
ment and of price stability as inconsistent, I think
that fundamentally price stability will promote a
high level of output by avoiding a good many of
the interruptions to output that we have had in
the past, by giving people stable expectations,
and so on.”54
Sixth, the preceding two points combined
with his doubts about fiscal policy meant that
Friedman believed that monetary policy was
sufficient to control inflation. The “sufficient”
language was used in Friedman (1958b), and con-
trasts Friedman’s position directly with Keynes’s
view that monetary policy actions could not be
sufficient for delivering price stability (see Nelson
and Schwartz, 2008).
Turning now to contributions present in
Friedman (1956), a seventh 1950s’ contribution
by Friedman was to specify money demand as
dependent on a vector of interest rates. This means
that the monetary policy transmission mechanism
cannot be summarized by a single interest rate.
Patinkin (1969) claims that Friedman’s specifying
money demand as dependent on interest rates
makes his specification Keynesian. This over-
looks the fact that Friedman does not condense
the nonmoney assets into a single asset, as
Keynesian analysis typically did. Moreover, pre-
Keynes writers had made money demand interest
elastic, and the specifics of Friedman’s money
demand approach differ from those of Keynes.
Keynes had broken money demand into transac-
tions and speculative components, with only the
second component interest-elastic and otherwise
“idle.” Friedman (1956) rejects the concept of idle
money and instead models every unit of money
as interest-elastic (possibly relative to own-rates),
and held for all motives at the same time (an aspect
of Friedman’s analysis acknowledged by Patinkin,
1965, p. 75).
Eighth, Friedman (1956) indicates that his
conception of money demand rules out the liquid-
ity trap, which he argued in Friedman (1972a)
was central to the General Theory. In light of the
discussions of the liquidity trap in recent years
by Paul Krugman and Lars Svensson,55 and their
attribution of liquidity-trap views to Keynes, it
may come as a surprise that Patinkin (1972a) and
many other Keynesians objected to Friedman’s
association of the General Theory with the liquid-
ity trap. But it was hardly an off-the-wall inter-
pretation on Friedman’s part. James Schlesinger,
by no means a close ally of Friedman, argued
strongly that the liquidity-trap thesis was central
to the General Theory in his 20-year retrospective
on the book. Schlesinger (1956), Friedman (1972a),
and Beenstock (1980) all provide their own, appar-
ently independently constructed, lists of quotations
from Keynes (1936) supporting this interpretation,
and even Patinkin (1976a) acknowledged that
passages of the General Theory treat the liquidity
trap as empirically relevant. As Friedman (1972a,
p. 942) put it, again and again, Keynes’s “final
line of defense is absolute liquidity preference.”
Over 1948-58, all the elements of Friedman’s
monetarism fell into place and are recognizable
as the positions he took in what he termed the
“dispute in the 1950s or early 1960s” in the United
States56 and in the subsequent debate around the
world from the late 1960s. This crystallization of
Friedman’s framework was occurring when the
dominant thinking on monetary policy in the
United Kingdom was converging toward an almost
completely different framework.
THE ROAD TO RADCLIFFE
Friedman (1968c, p. 439) noted, “Experience
with monetary policy after World War II very
quickly produced a renewed interest in money
and a renewed belief that money matters.” But
later, viewing the 1950s and 1960s as a whole,
Friedman (1987, p. 13) concluded that the expe-
rience of the period “strongly reinforced” the
Keynesian critique of monetary policy, and
Friedman and Schwartz (1982, p. 17) argue that
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54 March 25, 1952, testimony, in Joint Committee on the Economic
Report (1952, p. 727). Formulations such as this were precursors
to the descriptions of the inflation problem given by many who
worked in policymaking from the late 1970s onward, both in the
United Kingdom and the United States (regarding the latter, see
the statements by Paul Volcker and Alan Greenspan quoted in
Lindsey, Orphanides, and Rasche, 2005).the revival of the quantity theory of money did
not really take off until the 1960s. Evidently, the
1951 abandonment of cheap money policies was
not quite as great a breakthrough as Friedman and
other advocates of monetary policy had imagined.
What went wrong?
Friedman was, on the whole, pleased with
the course that monetary policy followed in the
United States during the 1950s. But even in the
U.S. case he was uneasy about the continuing
emphasis on fiscal and other nonmonetary influ-
ences when it came to accounting for economic
fluctuations; thus Friedman (1955, p. 32) referred
to “the intellectual climate of today and the recent
past, with its derogation of the significance of
monetary factors.” Furthermore, diagnoses of
inflation were becoming less orthodox with the
growing appeal from the mid-1950s of explana-
tions that downplayed demand factors and instead
stressed “cost-push.”
In the United Kingdom, the trend of opinion
against monetary policy was even stronger. The
ending of cheap money was more hesitant; cer-
tainly interest rates were raised in 1951, but they
were cut in 1954 while the economy was gathering
steam. The really concerted tightening of mone-
tary policy in the United Kingdom in the 1950s
was concentrated in the years 1955-58, which may
be why Friedman (1963b, p. 7) once said that the
U.K. cheap money period ended “a few years”
after 1951. The tightening began with increases
in Bank Rate in January-February 1955 under
Chancellor of the Exchequer R.A. Butler, and was
followed by further increases under his successors
in 1956 and 1957. The 1955-58 subperiod distin-
guishes itself from the preceding and subsequent
epochs by the extent to which the authorities
were attributed interest in control of the stock of
money. For example, Financial Times columnist
Harold Wincott contemplated what would happen
“if Mr. Butler continues with his policy of contract-
ing the supply of money and credit” (Financial
Times, October 4, 1955), while the Financial
Times’s “Lombard” commentator said that the
“ultimate aim of the Government’s credit restric-
tion drive is, of course, to exert a downward
pressure on the supply of money strong enough
to keep spending power within the limits of the
country’s available resources” (November 30, 1955;
emphasis added). In the September 1957 round
of tightening, policymakers themselves became
very explicit about their intention to restrict the
money supply, with speeches to that effect by
the prime minister (Harold Macmillan) and
Treasury ministers.
The emphasis on monetary aggregates at this
early stage may seem anomalous, as the official
money series (M0, M1, M3, and so on) that would
become familiar in later years were not available.
Many have noted that U.K. money supply data
were not available to Keynes when he wrote on
monetary affairs (see, e.g., Patinkin, 1976b), and
Walters (1970) conjectures that a historical series
for U.K. money was not put together until the early
1960s. One should not exaggerate the absence of
monetary data, however; the weekly release of
the Bank of England’s balance sheet gave most of
the information needed to construct currency and
monetary base series; and the various releases of
the clearing banks and other institutions provided
information on deposits. These releases were the
subject of regular attention in the financial press.57
The main problem for potential investigators of
monetary relations was constructing long series
free of breaks and double-counting. It was also
well known that the basic data for constructing a
long historical money series were available far
back for the United Kingdom; Friedman (1961b,
p. 270) referred to the availability of U.K. deposit
data back to the 1870s.
The would-be revival of monetary policy in
the United Kingdom suffered severe criticism
once the 1955 interest rate increases failed to
deliver the desired results during the year. The
Guardian’s financial editor had already claimed,
“It is now generally agreed that the experiment
of checking inflation by monetary policy alone
has not been a success” (Manchester Guardian,
December 12, 1955).
To many critics, the apparent failure of mone-
tary policy to deliver low inflation vindicated
57 For example, for much of the 1940s and 1950s there was regular
space devoted in the Financial Times to the Bank of England’s
balance sheet release. Deposit data were discussed regularly too;
for example, in the Financial Times of November 30, 1955.
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because aggregate demand was interest inelastic.
This notion, already embodied in the General
Theory to some extent,58 had been reinforced in
the United Kingdom in the prewar and early post-
war period by surveys of firms carried out by
Oxford University. The survey results seemed,
as discussed, for example, by Schlesinger (1956,
p. 603), to vindicate the view that firms’ invest-
ment decisions were interest inelastic (and with
them the whole of aggregate demand, as most
Keynesian work had already narrowed the interest
rate channel to investment).
Friedman was scathing about the value of
questionnaires of businessmen. “That is not evi-
dence…I do not care what they have said,” he said
on a panel in 1950.59 In 1979, Friedman added,
“Economics is a serious subject, and one of the
things we’ve learned in that subject is that if you
want to know how people behave, you don’t ask
them. You look.”60 The joint behavior of real
returns and the stock of productive capital led
Friedman to believe that investment was instead
“highly elastic” with respect to real interest rates
(Friedman and Schwartz, 1982, p. 494). Friedman’s
reaction to the survey results paralleled that of
his hero Dennis Robertson, who had said in 1949
that he had “a hunch that the reaction among the
neo-Keynesians against the importance of the
causal influence of the rate of interest on capital
outlay has been carried too far…Does anyone here,
I wonder, share my doubts—my very respectful
doubts—about the significance of those replies
to questionnaires?” (Robertson, 1949, p. 20).
Keynesians not only doubted the effectiveness
of monetary policy as a demand-control measure;
they argued that efforts to control inflation via
demand measures might in any case be misguided.
The Financial Times editorialized during the
initial tightenings that there was “still something
of a mystery about the origins of the inflationary
forces threatening the British economy”
(February 15, 1955). Despite their use of monetary
policy tightening, policymakers shared the view
that much inflation was cost-push in character, a
view evident in their repeated attempts to secure
an agreement with the private sector on wage
growth limits.
The skeptical sentiments regarding monetary
policy made by Keynesians since the 1930s were
synthesized and consolidated in the report on
monetary policy delivered by the Radcliffe
Committee to the U.K. government in August 1959.
The Radcliffe Report argued that monetary policy
was ineffective. It did not rely on the liquidity
trap argument but used lines of reasoning that
delivered as complete an ineffectiveness result
as that associated with the liquidity trap. Whereas
Keynes’s liquidity trap argument said that money
and government securities could become equiva-
lent at a low interest rate, the Radcliffe Committee
argued that important asset prices were unaffected
by open market operations that switched money
for short-term securities, even when these opera-
tions changed the short-term interest rate. Thus
while open market operations could alter policy
rates, they affected only the composition, not the
aggregate, of “liquidity,” which was the financial
quantity that really mattered; financial innova-
tion, it was argued, had eliminated much of the
difference between money and Treasury bills.
The interest rates that policy could affect, the
Committee argued, mattered negligibly for
aggregate demand, while the asset prices that
did matter for aggregate demand depended on
the “liquidity” total, which was generally not
susceptible to central bank manipulation. The
Committee also endorsed cost-push views of
inflation.61
Friedman and Schwartz (1982, p. 52) observe
that the Radcliffe Committee was “faithful to
Keynes” in emphasizing the ineffectiveness of
monetary policy arising from the alleged equiva-
lence of money and securities. But the Committee,
by claiming that monetary policy was ineffective
generally, not just in Depression conditions, was
taking a harder-line position than Keynes usually
did. The Committee’s basis for this conclusion
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58 See, for example, the passage cited in Patinkin (1976a, p. 103).
59 Friedman, speaking in Wright (1951, p. 251).
60 In Anderson (1982, pp. 201-02).
61 See Radcliffe Committee (1959); and for references to the relevant
sections, see, e.g., Laidler (1989) and Nelson (2009).was that financial innovation—for example, the
growth of nonbank intermediaries—put the deter-
mination of important asset prices outside the
reach of monetary policy. While the emphasis on
financial innovation did not have a counterpart
in Keynes’s General Theory, it paralleled the
approach that Gurley and Shaw (1960) were tak-
ing in analyzing U.S. financial behavior. Noting
the connection, Friedman and Schwartz (1970)
treated Gurley-Shaw and Radcliffe as advocates
of the same “liquidity” argument, while Friedman
and Schwartz (1982, p. 209) referenced Radcliffe
and Gurley-Shaw together when citing studies
that minimized the significance of money and
monetary policy actions. Monetarists were not
impressed by the Radcliffe/Gurley-Shaw argu-
ments from the beginning, and the monetarist
side of the argument was what—eventually—
won the day in the economics profession. Brunner
(1985, p. 22) observed witheringly that there really
was “no logical link between negative conclusions
bearing on monetary policy, and the discussion
of financial innovations…Gurley and Shaw
argued more than 20 years ago that the explosive
growth of savings and loans associations erodes
the potency of monetary policy. The subsequent
evolution discredited such fears or hopes.”
Friedman’s initial public response to the
Radcliffe Report was muted. Alvin Marty thanked
Friedman for “exceedingly helpful substantive
comments” on a paper published in early 1961 in
which Marty said the “Radcliffe Report is a striking
example of failure to offer a shred of evidence.”62
In a book review published at the end of 1961,
Friedman (1961a, pp. 1052-53) noted the problems
in defining “liquidity”; in 1964, he said that the
Radcliffe Committee’s liquidity concept was
“an undefined term which covers the universe,”63
while Friedman and Schwartz (1970, p. 130)
added that the Radcliffe Committee itself could not
settle on a firm liquidity definition.64 Friedman
denounced the theories offered by the Radcliffe
Committee as “a false trail that will not in fact be
productive” (Friedman, 1963b, p. 9) and went on
to applaud the negative reception the Radcliffe
Report had received among “academic economists
and others.”65 Friedman’s appraisal that the Report
had been received negatively rested largely on
the U.S. reaction; in the United Kingdom, many
policy and academic figures greeted the Report
favorably.
In U.K. policymaking, confidence in monetary
policy restriction as the cure for inflation reached
its peak in 1957 and was followed by a period of
substantial monetary policy easing. Friedman
(1980b) argued that the shift to expansionary
policies (both monetary and fiscal) in the United
Kingdom from the later 1950s onward was a vin-
dication of his (1954) prediction. He had predicted
that overreaction to actual or prospective minor
recessions would produce a tendency for the
authorities to overexpand. Complementing this
explanation is the fact that the U.K. authorities
after 1957 were much more inclined to view
incomes policies as the appropriate means of
fighting inflation. Even when inflation fell in the
late 1950s, to the point of delivering price stability
in 1960, the success was attributed to favorable
cost-push shocks rather than to the 1955-58
restrictive monetary policy. For example, The
Economist (August 29, 1970) attributed the fall
in inflation from 1958 to 1960 to less-militant




In a new round of monetary policy tightening
in July 1961, the Macmillan government raised
Bank Rate to 7 percent. This was not an unambigu-
ous affirmation of the role on monetary policy,
because it was muddied by a simultaneous
attempt by the government at a wage freeze (a
“pay pause”). But after a year of tight monetary
policy, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Selwyn
Lloyd, showed signs of determination to maintain
62 Marty (1961, pp. 56, 59).
63 Friedman (1964a; p. 73 of 1969 reprint).
64 The critical discussion of the Radcliffe Committee in Friedman
and Schwartz (1970) was originally part of their unpublished first
draft of their Trends study (Friedman and Schwartz, 1966).
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65 Friedman (1964a; p. 73 of 1969 reprint).a restrictive stance: “18 months ago there was
excess demand…Now, I think there is a measure
of disinflation…I think the economy is in better
shape, but you can’t have disinflationary measures
without there being, in result, a measure of disin-
flation…That means that some order books will
be shorter” (Yorkshire Post, July 11, 1962). Shortly
afterward, Lloyd was fired. The restrictive mone-
tary policy episode turned out to be only an inter-
ruption in the de-emphasis on monetary policy
signaled by the Radcliffe Report. The expansionary
policies prevailing before 1961 were revived in a
more-intense form. The more-expansionary policy
was associated with a shift up in money growth,
whether measured by the monetary base or by
Friedman and Schwartz’s (1982) M2 measure,
reversing the moderation in growth observed
during the 1961 squeeze (Figure 2). Consequently,
while the pickup in U.S. money growth in the
1960s initially exceeded that in the United
Kingdom, Friedman and Schwartz (1982, p. 157)
note that, from the mid-1960s, “the United
Kingdom took the lead—if that is the right word.”
Friedman viewed the U.K. monetary expan-
sion of the 1960s as contributing to the mood of
the country. “[T]he fact is that most people enjoy
the early stages of the inflationary process. Take,
for example, Britain in the Swinging Sixties”
(The Listener, April 24, 1980). One aspect of the
sustained expansionary policies of the 1960s that
did cause concern to the U.K. authorities was one
that Friedman would prefer they had been san-
guine about: the threat to the exchange rate. The
sterling/dollar rate was becoming more difficult
to maintain, even with the exchange control appa-
ratus, and speculation against it increased after
the Labour Party under Harold Wilson was elected
to office in 1964. Friedman (1965, p. 179) said
that while he happened to disagree with the poli-
cies Wilson had promised to carry out, he found
it objectionable that foreign central banks and
other holders of sterling were perceived as having
a “veto power” over their implementation. He
elaborated in September 1965 that this meant
“that British internal policy was shaped by offi-
cials who were not responsible to the British
Nelson















U.K. M2 and Monetary Base Growth (1948-75, annual data)electorate.”66 Friedman concluded that Wilson,
instead of negotiating a sterling rescue, should
have floated the pound on coming to office, blam-
ing the predecessor government for the likely
depreciation.67
The Wilson government finally did devalue
the pound sterling in November 1967, with the
14 percent adjustment providing another exam-
ple of what Friedman (1969, p. 20) called “this
awful business of holding and holding and hold-
ing to the last gasp and then having to make a big
change.” Friedman had anticipated the devalua-
tion and had wanted to speculate $30,000 against
the pound, only to find that his Chicago banks
did not have the wherewithal to carry out the
foreign exchange transaction (Sydney Morning
Herald, October 9, 1986). After the devaluation,
the Wilson government started expressing policy
commitments to the IMF in terms of quantitative
financial targets, and in 1969 it announced a tar-
get for domestic credit expansion (DCE). Although
interpreted as a concession to monetarists, the
DCE targets had the decidedly un-monetarist
implication of encouraging the authorities to
regard money base growth that came from balance
of payments surpluses as “good.” The policy
framework of a fixed exchange rate, attention to
DCE at the expense of the aggregate monetary base,
and incomes policies, contrasted with Friedman’s
recommendation of a sterling float, no incomes
policy, and direct control of the aggregate base or
aggregate bank reserves.
Issues
Monetarism and the Quantity Theory. It is
difficult to convey the dramatic shift in the
amount of coverage given to monetary policy in
the U.K. financial press and political debate in
the years 1968 to 1970 compared with the pre-
ceding three years 1965 to 1967. The increased
degree of coverage turned out to be permanent.
Some flavor is captured by the observation of the
magazine Management Today (August 1976):
“A decade ago economists, pundits and politi-
cians alike would have been amazed to learn that
in the mid-1970s debates over monetary policy
would have come to dominate the national and
international economic scene.”
The upsurge in the coverage of monetary
policy was accompanied by greatly increased
discussion of Friedman. While “Chicago School”
was probably the most widely used term to
describe the school of thought emphasizing money
(e.g., The Sun, October 7, 1968; The Observer,
April 20, 1969), and “Friedmanite” was used from
an early stage (e.g., Sunday Times, November 10,
1968), the U.K. debate also rapidly proliferated a
term that The Economist had used as early as 1963,
but which was starting to become prevalent in
the United States: “monetarist.” Robert Solow
used “monetarism” repeatedly in an article he
wrote for The Times (December 23, 1968), and
Paul Samuelson criticized “crude monetarism”
in a contribution to the Sunday Telegraph
(December 15, 1968).
Friedman often publicly criticized the terms
“monetarist” or “monetarism.” In an interview
with The Times in 1976, Friedman said, “It is not
a new position, and that is one of the reasons I
don’t like the word monetarism” (The Times,
September 13, 1976).68 As Friedman saw it, he
was not launching a new theory but bringing quan-
tity theorists’ work “down to date,”69 so that it
could be applied to the problems of the “bad old
present.”70 But Friedman (1978) confessed that
there was utility to the term monetarism because
there were some elements of older quantity theory
work that he and other monetarists had discarded.
In particular, an aspect of earlier quantity theory
analysis that Friedman explicitly rejected was
regarding velocity behavior as the outcome of an
institutionally determined payments process,
66 From Friedman’s 1965 Mont Pelerin Society meeting remarks,
published in Friedman (1968a, p. 274).
67 See, e.g., his remarks in Friedman and Roosa (1967, pp. 114-15)
and his 1968 memorandum in Friedman (1988).
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68 Anna Schwartz has suggested that another reason for Friedman’s
reservations about the word “monetarism” is that “I think he attrib-
uted it to Karl Brunner, who was not really a master of English.”
(Conversation with author, trip to Vermont Great Inflation confer-
ence, September 25, 2008.) Brunner is typically credited with the
term monetarist or monetarism, but both terms predate Brunner’s
usage of them (see Laidler, 2001; and the Oxford English Dictionary,
1976 and online editions).
69 Friedman (1972d, p. 12).
70 Friedman speaking in The Guardian, September 16, 1974.instead of as the result of decision problems by
households (e.g., Friedman, 1956, point 11;
Friedman, 1963b, p. 10; Friedman and Schwartz,
1982, pp. 38, 40, 62). Friedman himself used
“monetarism” and “monetarist” in his address
at the University of London (1970a). He became
accustomed to using these terms readily and with-
out prompting, including in correspondence and
conversation.
On some occasions Friedman also associated
the older quantity theory with a further retrograde
aspect, namely the assumption of price flexibility,
or, more fairly, of not having a firm description of
the adjustment process of prices to money (e.g.,
Friedman and Schwartz, 1982, p. 44). But he
generally qualified this case by describing it as
the “simple quantity theory” (e.g., Friedman and
Schwartz, 1982, pp. 59, 398). Further considera-
tion by Friedman during the 1970s of the quantity-
theory literature had the effect of leading him, if
anything, to attribute more to the older writers.
In particular, Friedman was struck by how explicit
David Hume’s writings had been on the role of
expectations: “David Hume has a statement some-
where about the fact that an increase in the quan-
tity of money stimulates economic activity only
so long as it keeps on increasing and people don’t
expect it” (The Times, September 13, 1976).
Friedman decided that while he, and Lucas and
Sargent after him, had expressed the point more
formally, the expectational Phillips curve idea was
due to Hume (Friedman, 1975b). While Patinkin
(1972b) claimed that Hume did not believe in a
long-run vertical Phillips curve, the explicit quo-
tations given in Friedman (1975b) support the
crediting of this idea to Hume, and Friedman’s
interpretation was more recently reaffirmed by
Mankiw (2001) in his study of the same Hume
passages.
Friedman further credited Hume with the
demand-for-money perspective on the quantity
theory that Friedman had used (Friedman and
Schwartz, 1982, p. 621). So whereas Friedman
(1968c, p. 433) attributed to Hume the “broad
outlines of the quantity theory,” by the early 1980s
he was crediting Hume with both the aggregate
demand and aggregate supply aspects of his own
framework and so, he said, Hume was the true
originator of monetarism. Appropriately enough,
it was on British television that Friedman said:
“I really would like to make clear that the doc-
trines I proclaim are not original with me by any
means, in fact if I have to find a source for them
they are [from] David Hume.”71
In their interventions in the U.K. debate,
Samuelson and Solow argued that monetarism
was not making valid points about monetary rela-
tions that U.S. Keynesianism had not long since
incorporated. Samuelson, for example, said:
“Money was, so to speak, ‘rediscovered’ in my
country around 1950…When Professor Friedman
formulates his system in generality…it coincides
with the post-Keynesianism of the Tobin-
Modigliani type.” But the record does not support
the denial of Friedman’s contributions, nor
Samuelson and Solow’s confidence that U.S.
Keynesianism circa 1968 had incorporated the
role for monetary policy adequately. As we have
seen, Friedman’s emphasis on money predated
1950, and his elaboration of it incorporated a
general transmission mechanism not covered in
Keynesian work; in particular, more than one
interest rate, and (in contrast to positions taken
by Samuelson and Modigliani) a sensitivity of
consumption (not merely investment) to interest
rates.72 Furthermore, Solow and Samuelson in
both the 1960s and 1970s disputed Friedman’s
expectational Phillips curve analysis, contesting
both its long-run vertical property and its exclu-
sion of a systematic role for cost-push factors.
In well-known lectures given in Manchester, for
example, Solow (1969) argued that cost-push fac-
tors mattered greatly in both the United Kingdom
and the United States, that demand factors barely
mattered at all for U.K. inflation, and that the U.S.
Phillips curve was permanently nonvertical.
Some influence of the money supply debate
was felt in what policymakers said: Chancellor
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71 Free to Choose, BBC2 debate, March 22, 1980, p. 15 of transcript.
Likewise, at a press conference in Wellington, New Zealand, in
1981, Friedman said, “What is called monetarism, the quantity
theory of money, was developed by David Hume in the eighteenth
century. It is not ‘my’ theory—I have no patent on it” (Evening Post,
April 27, 1981).
72 See Blinder (1986) and Modigliani (1986) for characterizations of
the pre-monetarist Keynesian view as one that denied the interest
sensitivity of consumption.of the Exchequer Roy Jenkins stated, “I attach the
greatest importance to monetary policy” (House
of Commons Debates, April 15, 1969, p. 1007);
and The Economist (April 18, 1970) referred to
the “new importance attached to monetary policy
in Britain.” As noted above, however, the changes
actually made in the macroeconomic policy frame-
work were not truly in the direction Friedman
wanted. Indeed, at the U.K. Treasury, skepticism
prevailed from top to bottom about the attention
being given to Friedman. At a junior level, Treasury
economist Stephanie Edge spoke in favor of the
power of fiscal policy and criticized Friedman’s
findings to the contrary: “The idea that simple
one-equation comparisons can reveal anything is
one that should be vigorously attacked” (Edge,
1967, p. 205). At a senior level, Treasury adviser
Alec Cairncross wrote in his diary of October 6,
1968, that “the English press (and especially The
Times) was making such a fool of itself over Milton
Friedman” (Cairncross, 1997, p. 327).
Cairncross’s reference to The Times concerned
the articles being written by its economics editor,
Peter Jay. Jay was initially regarded with suspicion
on each side of the money supply debate as a
sympathizer with the other side. But further arti-
cles by Jay brought him out as a supporter of the
monetarist arguments, and Jay later identified
himself among “those…who began to advocate
proper control of the money supply from the
late 1960s” (Independent, September 23, 1991).
Friedman and Jay became good friends, appearing
together on several episodes of both the U.S. and
U.K. versions of the Free to Choose television pro-
gram in 1980. In one of these programs, Friedman
said that he and Jay “are in almost complete agree-
ment on the desirable monetary policy.”73
Another journalist, Samuel Brittan, serves as
an illustration of Friedman’s observation that
“accidents play an enormous role in mankind’s
experience.”74 Friedman happened to be visiting
Cambridge University while Brittan was an under-
graduate student there, and Brittan happened to
have Friedman assigned to him as his tutor. Brittan
joined the Financial Times after graduation.
Brittan considered the arrival of monetarism the
“most interesting event for a very long time in
the realm of economic ideas” (Financial Times,
January 8, 1970). A long article by Brittan, headed
“MONEY SUPPLY: The Great Debate” in an enor-
mous font, appeared in the October 25, 1968, edi-
tion of the Financial Times, discussing Friedman’s
views and covering his American Economic
Association presidential address (Friedman,
1968b). Brittan and David Laidler, who had been
a Ph.D. student of Friedman’s at Chicago and from
the late 1960s was at Manchester University,
became two leading voices of monetarism in the
United Kingdom during the 1970s. Cobham (1984)
notes that although Laidler departed for Canada
in 1975, he remained prominent in the U.K. debate
during the second half of the 1970s. Neither Brittan
nor Laidler was an echo chamber for Friedman,
and both disagreed with him in print, but they
both had firsthand knowledge of his positions.
As Friedman observed, “You have the interesting
phenomenon that whereas David Laidler came
to Chicago, Chicago came to Sam Brittan.”75
Alan Walters, an academic and financial con-
sultant who had been undertaking U.K. analogues
of some of Friedman’s empirical work since the
early 1960s, wrote to Friedman at the end of the
decade to let him know that he was close to being
a household name in the United Kingdom.76
The Beginning of Monetary Trends. In
November 1966, Friedman and Anna Schwartz
completed a draft of their manuscript on monetary
trends, concerned solely with U.S. data, and sub-
mitted it to the NBER review process. Friedman
(1955, p. 30) had written about the desirability
of studying U.K. monetary data, and, somewhere
along the line, Friedman and Schwartz elected
to cover U.K. data in the revised version of their
Trends manuscript, although it was not a change
specifically requested by the NBER. A major
obstacle, the construction of historical data, was
73 Free to Choose, PBS debate, Episode 3, pp. 16-17 of PDF transcript.
74 April 16, 1996, talk by Friedman at Claremont College (broadcast
C-SPAN, December 26, 1996).
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75 Friedman, speaking in September 1974, in Institute of Economic
Affairs (1974, p. 102). 
76 Letter from Alan Walters to Milton Friedman, December 4, 1969,
Friedman office correspondence (uncatalogued as of end-2007).partly overcome when David Sheppard, a Harvard
Ph.D. graduate shortly to return to the United
Kingdom, contacted Friedman to let him know
of his work in the area. In his reply to Sheppard,
Friedman indicated that U.K. data were being
incorporated into his new volume with
Schwartz.77 He and Schwartz thereafter used the
Sheppard data on money. Anna Schwartz used
the data in a 1969 paper for U.K. audiences
(Schwartz, 1969), and Friedman referred fleet-
ingly to the Trends project during Congressional
testimony in October 1969, where he said he had
been “working on some British data which go
back a century. They show the same relation
[as in the United States].”78 Considering this
energetic start in the late 1960s, Friedman and
Schwartz surely could not have imagined that




The Conservative Party, led by Edward Heath,
won the U.K. general election of June 1970.
Friedman had not met Heath (The Listener,
February 11, 1971). There is nevertheless evidence
of an influence of Friedman’s writings on Heath’s
statements. Heath’s introduction to his 1970 party
platform said, “[O]nce a policy is established, the
Prime Minister and his colleagues should have
the courage to stick to it. Nothing has done Britain
more harm in the world than the endless backing
and filling which we have seen in recent years”
(The Guardian, May 27, 1970). It is possible that
the drafting of this passage was influenced by
Friedman and Schwartz’s (1963, p. 289) charac-
terization of the Federal Reserve’s history as one
of “so much backing and filling, so much confu-
sion about purpose…”
There was less indication that the new govern-
ment would be influenced by the Friedman-
Schwartz work when it came to monetary policy
formulation, as Anna Schwartz discovered on a
visit to the United Kingdom very soon after the
election result. Writing to Friedman about her
meetings with U.K. academic economists and
Bank of England officials, Schwartz reported:
“Much talk generally of what difference the
Conservative Government would make for mon-
etary policy…[The Bank officials] didn’t see that
it would make any difference. Apparently, Bank
policy is perfect.”79
On the matter of the government’s role in the
market, the prospect seemed more favorable that
U.K. economic policy would go in a direction
favored by Friedman. Friedman said in 1971,
“My own personal view is that…the most effective
road to development is through free enterprise
and private investment, and that the government
can serve best by limiting itself to essential govern-
ment functions.”80 In the same year, the Heath
government objectives were laid out by the
Chancellor of the Exchequer, Tony Barber, in a
form that seemed in keeping with Friedman’s
views: “Our object is to lessen government interfer-
ence and reduce government subsidies; to extend
the opportunities for profitable enterprise; to
widen the area within which industry rather than
government will make decisions” (Dallas Morning
News, February 9, 1971). Friedman expressed
cautious approval, observing that the United
Kingdom had “potential, but only if you could
by some miracle get rid of the enormous mass of
controls, interventions, welfare-state measures
and so on…Heath has been moving somewhat in
that direction” (Vision, April 1972).
The Heath government moved away from
free-market policies during 1971 and made the
break more explicit with the passage of the
Industry Act 1972. The act introduced extensive
subsidies to private investment, contrary to
Friedman’s dictum, “Capital investment that has
to be subsidized is not worth having” (Wall Street
Journal, February 12, 1997).
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papers.
80 Friedman (1971a, p. 847).The change in direction was felt also in the
Heath government’s policies against inflation.
The government started cutting Bank Rate in
April 1971. It had consistently seen inflation as
a nonmonetary problem and in November 1972
imposed wage-price controls.
Also in 1970, Friedman had his first published
exchange with a U.K. critic of his work. The
Radcliffe Report had given Friedman a heads-up
about the skepticism regarding monetary policy
prevailing in the United Kingdom. Along with
Richard Kahn, Nicholas Kaldor was regarded as
a major academic influence on the Report. Shortly
before Friedman’s visit, Kaldor (1970) restated the
U.K. anti-monetary policy position and used a
reverse causation argument to dispute Friedman’s
findings. If, Kaldor argued, the authorities actually
undertook measures that delivered them control
of the money stock, their actions on money would
face permanent, completely offsetting movements
in velocity. Historical relations between money
and other variables, according to this argument,
simply reflected reverse causation—the passive
creation of money in response to price and output
movements. Price and output behavior would, it
was argued, have been no different if the monetary
authorities had somehow prevented this money
creation from taking place.
The way that Friedman (1970c) answered
Kaldor was by appealing to the fact that money
had been connected to income and inflation under
many different monetary arrangements, under-
mining an explanation of the correlation like
Kaldor’s that relied on the existence of a particular
policy regime or on the institutional conditions
prevailing in the United Kingdom.
The Bretton Woods system collapsed during
the early 1970s, despite what Friedman said was
officials’ belief that “they can put Humpty Dumpty
together again.”81 The London Evening Standard’s
financial columnist blamed the foreign exchange
market turmoil on the “incredible influence of
economist Milton Friedman,” charging that
Friedman’s theories had discouraged international
coordination of policies (May 5, 1971). Though
he would surely have liked to accept the credit
for the advent of floating rates, Friedman con-
cluded that his advocacy of flexible rates had had
“absolutely no effect,” and that it was instead the
“brute force of events” that had forced govern-
ments to realize that fixed exchange rates were
untenable (The Listener, April 27, 1978). The
pound sterling began floating in June 1972.
In early December 1972, Friedman learned
that a debate had been taking place in the London
Times about his 1967 American Economic
Association presidential address. His statement
there (Friedman, 1968b, p. 11), that “full adjust-
ment” to a shift in the inflation rate takes “a cou-
ple of decades,” had been interpreted by one critic
as implying that removing inflation would take 20
years of above-normal unemployment. Friedman
wrote a letter to The Times (dated December 6 and
published December 12) to clarify that by “full
adjustment” he meant resettling at the steady state.
“The important point is that while ‘full’ adjust-
ment may well last several decades, the period
of unusually high unemployment is far shorter,
more like two to five years.” Around the same
time, in a submission to the U.S. Congress Joint
Economic Committee, Friedman had occasion to
convey his opinion of the U.K./France Concorde
project. That project had reached fruition partly
from the injection of funds from the U.K. govern-
ment. The result was an air service that took
hours off of intercontinental travel, but only for
the elite class of customers who could afford the
ultrahigh ticket prices. Friedman (1958a) had
criticized the involvement of the government
sector in the creation of “monuments” that did
not raise ordinary living standards, and his
Congressional submission (dated December 11,
1972) urged that the United States government
not follow the Concorde precedent by subsidizing
a U.S. supersonic transport (SST). “A govern-
mental decision to produce an SST largely at its
own expense is a step toward socialism and away
from free enterprise.”82
Though the preceding two items do not appear
in his published bibliographies, they could easily
have become the last things Friedman ever wrote
81 September 23, 1971, testimony, in Joint Economic Committee
(1971, p. 699).
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82 In Joint Economic Committee (1973a, p. 81).for publication. On December 15, Friedman had
open-heart surgery. The surgery was successful
and Friedman was discharged on December 26
(Kansas City Times, December 27, 1972), but
Friedman lost considerable weight in the wake
of the surgery, and his family medical history was
inauspicious. As Anna Schwartz has observed,
“Who would have thought at that time that
Friedman would live on to ninety-four?”83
From the United States, Friedman criticized
U.K. monetary policy developments during 1973,
observing in Congressional testimony that “defec-
tive as our policy has been, it has been less erratic,
more moderate than the policy of most other lead-
ing countries.”84 He observed later in the year that
Heath had gone from what Friedman perhaps too
generously called a “tight money policy” to “a
policy of stimulating…Now you have prices rising
in Britain at a rate of something over 10% a year”
(Friedman, 1973b, p. 33). The British magazine
Management Today pondered Heath’s and
Friedman’s contrasting diagnoses of the inflation
problem in its August 1973 issue: “But is the entire
phenomenon of unusually rapid and apparently
ineradicable inflation new in itself?,” its editorial
asked. “Is it a different variety, considerably more
virulent, of the disease to which Western society
has been susceptible for many decades past? The
temptation, of course, is to say that it is: to blame
union militancy…But economic historians half a
century hence may well not be impressed by this
argument. To them, the inflation will probably
seem a classic case of monetary inflation, engen-
dered by the usual process of overproduction of
liquid currencies.”
The editorial just quoted was something of
an outlier in the general U.K. discussion in 1973.
The tendency to consider inflation to be non-
monetary in character intensified in the wake
of the oil and other commodity price shocks of
that year. Wherever he went during the 1970s,
Friedman found himself having to explain the
fallacy inherent in special-factor explanations
for inflation. “Arithmetic is one thing and eco-
nomics is a very different thing,” was how
Friedman put it in one appearance (Meet the Press,
November 12, 1978). “The great confusion in this
area is to confuse particular prices with prices in
general.” In 1979 Friedman, perhaps near his wit’s
end, reiterated: “OPEC does not cause inflation;
no, sir.”85
What Friedman (1975a, p. 137) called the
U.K.’s “major economic crisis in early 1974,” with
U.K. inflation passing 15 percent, culminated in
an election that returned Harold Wilson to power.
Friedman noted that the recent U.K. elections
had helped refute the claim that governments
do not lose elections because of high inflation.
“Inflation surely helped to make Mr. Edward
Heath Prime Minister in 1970,” Friedman (1974,
p. 44) observed, “and, even more surely, ex-Prime
Minister in 1974.”
The centerpiece of the Wilson government’s
incomes policies measures was intended to be
its “Social Contract” agreement with the unions.
Friedman said that “the so-called Social Contract…
gives people a false impression of both the causes
of inflation and the way to cure it” (BBC2,
November 9, 1976). The Social Contract would
do “no good whatsoever as long as they continue
to run the printing press” (Friedman, 1975d, p. 20);
and, if money growth was slowed, the Social
Contract would be seen as having been successful,
even though the reduction in inflation would be
the same without the Contract (Newsweek,
September 20, 1976).
Friedman paid a one-week visit to the United
Kingdom in September 1974. Reflecting on his
visit a few months later, Friedman was particu-
larly struck by the continuing popularity of the
wage-push explanation. “In Britain, the explana-
tion that everybody gives for inflation is that
inflation is caused by trade unions, the greedy
grasping laborers who force up the wages that
cause inflation” (Friedman, 1975d, pp. 5, 7).
During his visit Friedman had written to The
Economist saying he had “been dismayed, even
in my few days in London, at the widespread
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p. 154.)support of ‘union bashing’ as a way to attack
inflation” (The Economist, September 28, 1974).
While Friedman argued in 1978 that there
was “almost no one who any longer has a good
word to say about nationalization,” he had to
admit that in the United Kingdom the trend had
been to extension of nationalization (The Listener,
April 27, 1978). Indeed, Harold Wilson’s account
of his 1974-76 term in office (Wilson, 1979, p. 35)
includes a six-line list of the nationalization plans
his government outlined in 1974, and the Labour
government did proceed to extend nationaliza-
tion to the shipbuilding industry. With Thomas
Balogh, one of Friedman’s Keynesian opponents,
as one of the ministers responsible, the Department
of Energy also increased the government’s stake
in the oil industry—leading to Friedman’s obser-
vation, “You have been nationalizing North Sea
oil” (The Listener, April 27, 1978). Some of the
oil-industry nationalization was wound back in
the austerity measures of late 1976, when the
Callaghan government announced the sale of
part of its interest in British Petroleum.
The U.K. private corporate sector over this
period was suffering a pronounced squeeze.
“Great Britain had a much more severe financial
crisis than we did,” Friedman observed.86 The
stock market experienced a major collapse, its
index standing in 1974 at its late 1950s’ value
(Bordo and Wheelock, 2004), and the U.K. long-
term corporate bond market virtually disappeared
in the second half of the 1970s. Friedman noted
that a “proper climate” for growth required
“investment, enterprise, the ability to borrow
capital” (Dallas Morning News, October 17, 1975),
but in the U.K. case he observed that “the domes-
tic capital markets are so disorganized by erratic
inflation, excessive taxation, and government
intervention” (Newsweek, December 27, 1976).
It was, however, foreign exchange market
turmoil that led to the United Kingdom negotiating
a loan from the IMF in late 1976. The Callaghan
government, including Chancellor of the
Exchequer Healey, appealed to the stringent terms
of the loan as the reason it had to undertake cuts
in government expenditure. Friedman maintained
that the government’s recourse to the IMF was
just a charade: “Your government has gone to the
IMF so that they can lay down rules for the man-
agement of your economy…It’s like the way big
corporations use management consultants. The
corporations know perfectly well what must be
done, but they want to blame the unpleasant reme-
dies on someone else” (Daily Mail, September 30,
1976). No doubt there was a considerable element
of validity to this conjecture, as senior members
of the Callaghan government had indeed accepted
the need to shift the division of resources between
the public and private sectors. But Friedman went
too far with his further claim, “The British govern-
ment knows that the only way to stop inflation is
for government to spend less and to create less
money” (Newsweek, October 11, 1976). This claim
attributed, yet again, acceptance of a monetary
view of inflation to the government. Such an
acceptance is not supported by the record of U.K.
policymakers’ views or behavior; on the contrary,
the government continued to point to the Social
Contract as a central part of its fight against infla-
tion and to claim that monetary policy alone could
not defeat inflation. A wage-push view of U.K.
inflation continued to dominate, and the govern-
ment saw monetary targets—the first publicly
announced target was for the financial year start-
ing in April 1976—as a means of helping to avoid
adding demand-pull to the wage-push pressures.
Friedman subsequently pulled back from his late
1976 claim that the authorities knew inflation was
a monetary phenomenon. In a November 7, 1977,
talk, Friedman said, “If you listen to anybody
telling you about Great Britain’s plight, they will
tell you that the real problem in Great Britain is
that you have such strong trade unions, that they
push up wages and that causes inflation.”87
When the government announced its budget-
ary program in the wake of the IMF loan negotia-
tion, Friedman pronounced himself unimpressed,
pointing to the modest nature of the public expen-
diture cuts, the use of devices such as asset
sales, and the failure to cut tax rates (Daily Mail,
December 17, 1976). But the U.K. government’s
expenditure did fall substantially after 1976 as a
86 Milton Friedman Speaks, Episode 5, p. 23 of transcript.
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said in February 1978 that a “rather curious reason
for hope” was the fact that a “Labour Government
for two years in a row has been led by political
pressures to reduce government spending as a
fraction of income.”88
Another source of hope for Friedman was a
speech that Prime Minister Callaghan made on
September 28, 1976. The speech, written with the
assistance of Peter Jay (who, as well as being an
advocate of money supply control, was Callaghan’s
son-in-law), was widely interpreted as signaling
a repudiation of fine-tuning and Keynesian
demand management, and invoked elements of
the natural rate hypothesis. Friedman quoted the
speech in his Newsweek column (December 6,
1976) and in his Nobel lecture given in December
1976 (Friedman, 1977a). Truth to tell, Friedman
cited the speech excessively89 and exaggerated
its significance. The speech was not so dramatic
a break with the past. The fact is that there were
many occasions since the 1950s when prime
ministers had talked about inflation moving up
together with unemployment and on the danger
of overstimulating the economy. Callaghan’s
speech sidestepped the greater problem with U.K.
policymakers’ outlook on inflation, namely their
appeal to nonmonetary explanations.
Friedman appeared on BBC television in late
1976, in a studio debate taped in Chicago with
former Wilson government adviser and minister
Thomas Balogh. In the debate, Balogh said, “I
think that the Professor really is terribly naïve.”
Friedman responded, “Well, I may be naïve but
let me point out first that Mr. Balogh is simply
defending his own record. Britain is in the position
that it is because it listened to his advice and the
advice of people who believe the way he does.”
Friedman emphasized that he was not referring
only to the Labour governments with which Balogh
had been affiliated, but to postwar governments
of both parties, which he said had “generally fol-
lowed very much the same policies...I am trying
to argue against the general drift that has affected
both parties” (BBC1, December 6, 1976).
“That great prophet of monetarism, Milt [sic]
Friedman, is coming to Strathclyde University
[in Glasgow, Scotland] in April to lecture on infla-
tion,” observed The Scotsman’s business colum-
nist at the start of 1978 (January 25, 1978). In April
1978, Friedman, now 65 and sometimes describ-
ing himself as retired, duly appeared in the home
city of Adam Smith to give a lecture and press
conference. At his Glasgow appearances, Friedman
qualified his praise for the Callaghan government’s
reduction in the ratio of government spending to
GDP with criticism of its extensions of government
intervention in the marketplace. He also pro-
nounced himself unimpressed by the practical
changes made in U.K. monetary policy. “In Britain,
monetary targets have been adopted but have not
been kept. Mr. Callaghan has said there will be no
fine-tuning, but Mr. Healey has been fine-tuning”
(The Scotsman, April 22, 1978).
Another aspect of the U.K. policy framework
that was anathema to Friedman was the continued
proffering of incomes policies—or in Friedman’s
(1976b, p. 233) blunt characterization, “general
price or wage controls, euphemistically referred
to as ‘incomes policies’”—as a part of the govern-
ment’s anti-inflation strategy. Friedman had
observed early in the U.S. wage/price control
experiment (Newsweek, January 31, 1972):
“Experience in other countries [beside the United
States] suggests that for about a year such controls
generally look good; after about two years, they
collapse.” The incomes policies put in place in the
United Kingdom from 1972 to 1979 fell roughly
into the pattern Friedman described. Heath’s wage-
price controls imposed in 1972 suppressed infla-
tionary pressure for about a year before a breakout
at the end of 1973 and in early 1974. The Social
Contract of the Wilson government was largely
violated until a more legally binding version was
introduced in July 1975. U.K. inflation then gen-
erally declined for three years (1975-78), not two.
But monetary policy had been tightened in late
1975 and over 1976; it was only from early 1977
that the government’s incomes policies were
attempting to push inflation away from the direc-
tion implied by monetary policy. The substantial
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sions), in Milton Friedman Speaks, in Friedman (1992, 1997), etc.monetary stimulus created in 1977 was followed
by a collapse of the Social Contract at the end of
1978 and at the beginning of 1979. Shortly after-
ward, the Callaghan government lost a confidence
vote in Parliament and had to hold a general
election.
Friedman’s travels, interviews, and commen-
tary on current events meant that the Friedman-
Schwartz Monetary Trends study of the United
States and the United Kingdom was being slowed
down. Friedman told an audience in Sheffield,
England, in September 1970, “Mrs. Anna Schwartz
and I are currently engaged on a comparison of
U.S. and U.K. monetary trends…I had initially
hoped to present a paper on this work at this
seminar, but unfortunately the research did not
go rapidly enough” (Friedman, 1971b, p. 151). In
both that presentation and in Friedman lectures
in the following years (Friedman, 1972c, 1973a),
the U.K. coverage was limited mainly to discus-
sions of data plots. Friedman and Schwartz (1972,
p. 32) admitted, “Our estimate of the time it would
take us to complete the manuscript on monetary
trends has been unduly optimistic in the past…
[W]e shall refrain from projecting a date for com-
pletion.” The publication of Schwartz (1975)
indicated that progress was being made, and by
1979 the project was edging to the finishing line,
with publication projected for sometime in the
early 1980s.
Issues
Common Market Entry. Though he sometimes
referred to the “European countries and Britain”
(e.g., in Pringle, 2002, p. 22), Friedman usually
counted the United Kingdom as part of Europe.
In 1948 Friedman referred to “Europe, including
England” (New York Times, January 11, 1948)
and classed the United Kingdom within Europe
or Western Europe on later occasions too, includ-
ing in Friedman (1958a, p. 510) and Friedman
and Schwartz (1982, p. 309). A major issue for
the United Kingdom in the 1960s and continuing
into the 1970s was whether it should join other
major European countries in the European
Economic Community (EEC) or Common Market.
Friedman reminded people that he played a part
in the preparations for “the so-called Coal and
Steel Community—a precursor to the Common
Market” when he served as an adviser to the
Marshall Plan in 1950 (Newsweek, May 24, 1971).
In 1967, Friedman warned London newspaper
readers not to expect too much of EEC member-
ship. “Membership of the Common Market may
or may not be good for Britain, but it is not a
necessary part of the solution to Britain’s diffi-
culties. Germany in 1948 achieved an economic-
miracle policy by decontrol without any Common
Market” (Sunday Telegraph, June 25, 1967).
After unsuccessful attempts to negotiate
entry in the 1960s, the United Kingdom joined
the EEC at the start of 1973. By then, Friedman
had expressed concern about the direction of the
EEC, in particular the danger that it was “domi-
nated by the notion that it’s to serve as the super-
central planning body” for member countries
(Vision, April 1972). One of the planning meas-
ures undertaken by the EEC also went against
Friedman’s belief in free trade. “So far as the
Common Market is concerned, they have engaged
in agricultural protectionism on a large scale, as
you say,” Friedman observed in April 1978.90
“They are making a mistake in doing that.” In late
1978, the EEC started to move against something
Friedman regarded as one of the few favorable
economic policy developments in the 1970s:
floating exchange rates. The European Monetary
System (EMS) was set up at the end of 1978, to
commence in 1979. But, for now, the United
Kingdom would not be participating. The
Callaghan government had decided to stick to a
floating pound.
Democracy. Like Keynes before him,
Friedman in his work talked about the damaging
effects that inflation could have on the stability
of a democracy. For example, Friedman opened
his testimony to Congress in May 1959 with the
following: “Unless we can achieve both a reason-
ably stable economy in the short run and a reason-
ably stable price level in the long run, our free
enterprise economy is unlikely to be permitted
to survive.”91 In further testimony later that year,
Friedman said, “Wars aside, the chief economic
90 Milton Friedman Speaks, Episode 8, p. 26 of transcript.
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come from the sharp fluctuations…in economic
activity and in prices…that have threatened to
tear the social fabric asunder.”92 Another theme
in his work, central to Friedman (1962a), was
the presence of a sizable private sector as a nec-
essary condition for political freedom.
Friedman produced a storm when, in 1976,
he made use of these two themes to discuss the
state of the United Kingdom. On Meet the Press
(October 24, 1976), Friedman said, “Great Britain
is another horrible example…Britain is on the verge
of collapse.” Around the same time, Encounter
magazine published an article by Friedman, argu-
ing that the public sector had become so large a
fraction of the U.K. economy that democracy
was threatened: “I fear very much that the odds
are at least 50-50 that within the next five years
British freedom and democracy, as we have seen
it, will be destroyed.”93 The controversy intensi-
fied when Friedman made similar remarks in a
60 Minutes special on the U.K. economy broad-
cast in the United States on November 28.
Friedman’s observations produced a back-
lash in the U.K. press. The Daily Mirror called
Friedman the “smiling man of woe,” and an edi-
torial criticized his “biased view” and “doomsday
solutions” (November 30, 1976a and 1976b). The
Daily Express (November 30, 1976) said that
Friedman’s “sensible followers in this country—
particularly Mrs. Thatcher and Sir Keith Joseph—
must be in near despair” about his “absurdities.”
John Kenneth Galbraith joined in the criticism,
observing, “If the economists were right every
time they predicted a country was going down
the drain, there would be nowhere left” (Daily
Mirror, January 10, 1977).
The criticism that prompted Friedman to
react came from Samuel Brittan. Brittan published
an open letter to Friedman in his Financial Times
column, arguing that his “recent warnings about
the United Kingdom…represent personal hunches,
individual value judgments or exaggerations”
that could detract from Friedman’s insights on
monetary matters (Financial Times, December 2,
1976). Friedman in turn had an “Open Reply” to
Brittan defending his statements (Financial Times,
January 6, 1977).
This backlash against Friedman’s warnings
reflected a certain inconsistency on the part of
U.K. commentators. A substantial number of U.K.
leaders and U.K. economists had made comments
similar to Friedman’s about the threat to democ-
racy coming from economic instability. For exam-
ple, in a September 1976 television interview,
Prime Minister Callaghan had said, “If we were
to fail, I don’t think another government could
succeed. I do not think that would mean a National
[coalition] government. I fear it would lead to a
totalitarian government of the Left or the Right”
(The Sun, October 1, 1976). An economist at the
Bank of England, Charles Goodhart, had warned
(1975, p. 221) that continued stagflation of the sort
the Western economies had faced in the 1970s
“may well serve to destroy the atomistic, demo-
cratic, capitalist structure of their existing system.”
One element that contributed to the contro-
versy was Friedman’s emphasis on the threat to
democracy from a large government sector rather
than from inflation alone. Friedman was not, how-
ever, conflating the issues; he explicitly main-
tained that excessive growth of government did
social harm even if it were not accompanied by
inflation. “Ending inflation, in my opinion,”
Friedman said in 1981, “is a very desirable thing
to do. In my opinion, it is likely to be a necessary
precondition for resolving the other problems that
countries have, but it is not a be-all and end-all
of economic policy” (Evening Post, April 27, 1981).
In particular, Friedman contended that an inex-
orable rise in the government spending share of
GDP, “even if were accomplished without any
inflation whatever…would ultimately destroy
our freedom and society” (Evening Capital,
November 18, 1978).94
It was Friedman’s discussion of the U.K. gov-
ernment-to-GDP share that became the matter for
which a number of commentators took him to task.
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where of 60 percent was indeed the figure reported
by U.K. government publications as of early 1976.
But revisions during the year exposed double-
counting, and the official estimate was revised to
about 45 percent to 47 percent. Chancellor Healey
said that the corrected number refuted “the picture
of a profligate public sector as ignorantly pre-
sented by Professor Milton Friedman” (House of
Commons Debates, November 30, 1976, p. 715).
Some discussions, such as Begg (1987) and
Tomlinson (1990), mention Friedman’s use of
the 60 percent figure and create the impression
that, had the corrected number been known from
the start, there would have been no basis for
Friedman’s warnings about public expenditure
in the United Kingdom. This is questionable; for
one thing, Friedman stressed that his argument
did not rest on the present number being as high
as 60 percent (BBC1, December 6, 1976). For
another, Friedman would likely not have agreed
with all the statistical decisions used to reach
the 45 percent to 47 percent share.
Friedman likely would have insisted that
subsidies to firms and transfer payments to indi-
viduals be counted in the government spending
aggregate, and not (as is often the practice) as
“negative taxes.” My suspicion is that an estimate
that classed these items as spending—and which
was sure to include all government enterprises
in the government-spending estimate—would
show the share peaking above 50 percent during
the mid-1970s.
The Thatcher Government. “It’s not my job
to persuade people about things,” Friedman
argued (Omaha World-Herald, October 20, 1976;
“I just develop ideas and leave them around for
people to pick up.” Among those seen as pick-
ing up Friedman’s ideas in the late 1970s was
Margaret Thatcher, who had replaced Edward
Heath as Conservative Party leader in February
1975. Some have claimed that Thatcher had
monetarist ideas even in the late 1960s (Wapshott
and Brock, 1983, pp. 88, 187). But the Thatcher
statements offered as evidence on this point are
similar to those common among politicians at
the time—that is, she urged giving monetary
policy greater weight among the tools used for
demand management. The monetarist view of
inflation was not present in Thatcher’s 1960s’
statements. But there is no doubt that the position
on inflation taken by Thatcher and other senior
Opposition personnel converged in the late 1970s
toward the familiar monetarist one, and that the
policy framework of the Conservative Party on
returning to office in 1979 was shaped by the
monetarist position on inflation. Friedman him-
self is said to have first had detailed conversa-
tions with Thatcher in 1978 (Campbell, 2000,
p. 372). These probably took place during his
April 1978 visit to the United Kingdom.
Friedman, as discussed previously, was criti-
cal of the U.K. Conservative Party’s historical
record on economic policymaking. The impact
of his ideas on Conservative Party policy forma-
tion after 1975 did not come in for universal wel-
come on the part of conservatives in the United
Kingdom. The most well-known critics were
Edward Heath and other Conservative Party
advocates of incomes policy to fight inflation.95
But the economic substance of Friedman’s
arguments was nonpartisan. As early as 1968,
Robert Solow noted, “the association of monetar  -
ism with right-wing politics is not at all necessary”
(The Times, December 23, 1968). Friedman’s own
observations were in emphatic agreement with
Solow’s assessment. For example, Friedman (1978)
argued: “No doubt there are strong ideological
elements in the susceptibility of individuals,
including politicians and their advisors, to per-
suasion by either the monetarist or Keynesian
views. Yet the basic issue is scientific, not ideo-
logical…Whatever a man’s objectives, whatever
his ideology, he can pursue them more intelli-
gently the better he understands how the world
works.”
A specific scientific question underlay
much of the U.K. political debate from 1974
onward. The issue was whether incomes policy
was a valid weapon against inflation or whether
instead only monetary policy could accomplish
disinflation. The outcome of this debate rested
on the scientific question of whether inflation
Nelson
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95 The projected companion paper covering 1979-2006 will deal in
detail with Heath’s disagreements with Friedman, including those
covered in their radio debate in 1980.was a monetary phenomenon. One Labour-
supporting writer recognized the scientific aspect
to the debate in 1974, observing: “There is a dan-
ger that socialists will dismiss the monetarists’
argument simply because that school of thought
has hitherto been associated with right-wing con-
servatism. This is because the leading monetarist,
Professor Milton Friedman, has some very eccen-
tric right-wing views. But, in fact, the analysis of
the rate of inflation is in no way related to ideo-
logical conservatism…Socialists will have to come
to terms with this school of thought if we are to
effectively fight inflation” (New Statesman,
October 25, 1974).
Governments of both political parties in the
United Kingdom eventually assigned inflation
control to monetary policy. This reflected not
the triumph of ideology, but the fact that policy-
makers wanted inflation down, and had accepted
that, as a technical matter, the only way this could
be accomplished was through monetary policy.
As Friedman put it, “It’s not what I advocate that
matters; there is only one way to do it” (St. Louis
Globe-Democrat, December 16, 1977).
That convergence of the political parties’
positions had not yet occurred when the 1979
U.K. general election was held. The Callaghan
government went to the election with incomes
policy prominent in its platform, including a new
union/government agreement on wages to replace
the Social Contract, and plans to extend price
control, while the Conservative Party under
Thatcher rejected incomes policy in favor of a
focus on monetary control. Interviewed by BBC
television several months after Thatcher’s election
victory, Friedman underlined the change in direc-
tion, both with respect to monetary policy and to
the role of government, implied by Thatcher’s
coming to power. “If the Thatcher government
succeeds,” Friedman said, “it will be an example
that will not be lost on the United States or the
rest of the world.”96
CONCLUSION
The U.K. banking periodical Midland Bank
Review commented in its Summer 1979 issue on
the implications of the change of government for
the direction of economic policy. “The mantle of
Keynes, and particularly the embroideries of his
followers, appears to have worn thin; and the
mode has shifted towards the sterner lines of
thought popularized by Milton Friedman. The
new Government comes to office in a climate of
opinion very different from that which influenced
its Conservative predecessor.” Nevertheless,
Nicholas Kaldor was able to boast accurately that
Friedman had “made comparatively few converts
among academic economists” in the United
Kingdom.97 The support for Friedman’s ideas was
also thin among members of the new government,
once one looked below the most senior levels. In
these circumstances, and despite his drawing of
distinctions between his own positions and those
of the Thatcher government, Friedman would find
himself a central figure in the debate over the new
economic policies. In 1979 he was about to shift
to an even-higher profile in the United Kingdom
and, in defending his positions on monetary policy
and on the role of government, would encounter
in debate some of the most formidable figures in
U.K. economics and some of the biggest names
in both major political parties. 
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